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NOTES 
THE ROLE OF DIRECT-INJURY 
GOVERNMENT-ENTITY LAWSUITS 
IN THE OPIOID LITIGATION 
Edgar Aliferov* 
 
The opioid epidemic has ravaged the United States, killing over 100 
Americans every day and costing the nation upward of $90 billion a year.  
All branches and levels of the government have pursued measures to combat 
the epidemic and reduce its societal costs.  Perhaps the most interesting 
response is the emergence of direct-injury government-entity lawsuits, which 
seek to recover damages from opioid companies that facilitated prescription 
pill addictions.  Cities, counties, and states across the country are suing 
opioid manufacturers and distributors in unprecedented numbers. 
This Note explores the role of direct-injury government-entity claims as 
compared to other forms of civil litigation employed in the opioid crisis.  It 
highlights the obstacles faced by parens patriae actions, individual lawsuits, 
class actions, and aggregate actions in general.  This Note argues that direct-
injury government claims have important advantages over other forms of 
civil litigation because they overcome certain defenses related to victim 
blameworthiness and because they function as inherently representative 
actions that bypass the certification requirements of traditional aggregate 
actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every day, 115 Americans die from opioid addiction.1  Both former 
president Barack Obama2 and current president Donald Trump3 have labeled 
the opioid crisis a national emergency.  More Americans today use 
 
 1. Understanding the Epidemic, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/B5KM-HH3N] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 2. See Proclamation No. 9499, 3 C.F.R. 272, 273 (2016). 
 3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ but 
Requests No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/ 
us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/492C-M3BY]. 
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prescription painkillers than tobacco,4 and more people die from heroin than 
gun homicides.5  Drug overdoses are the “leading cause of injury death in the 
United States”6 and over 60 percent of those deaths involve an opioid.7 
The term “opioid” is used to describe a family of drugs prescribed 
primarily for pain relief and derived either naturally from opium plants or 
artificially by transforming “the chemical structure of . . . naturally occurring 
opioids.”8  When used recreationally, opioids produce a euphoric high that 
makes them “prone to abuse.”9  While pleasing at first, continual opioid 
abuse raises an individual’s tolerance to the drug (requiring higher doses to 
“produce pleasure comparable to that provided in previous drug-taking 
episodes”), and eventually the individual becomes dependent on opioids to 
avoid extreme withdrawal symptoms.10  There are various types of opioids 
and most correspond to a marketed pharmaceutical drug:  oxycodone 
(OxyContin, Percodan, Percocet), hydrocodone (Vicodin, Lortab, Lorcet), 
diphenoxylate (Lomotil), codeine, fentanyl (Duragesic), propoxyphene 
(Darvon), hydromorphone (Dilaudid), meperidine (Demerol), methadone, 
and morphine (Kadian, Avniza, MS Contin).11  Morphine, for example, is a 
natural chemical derived from the poppy plant and is used to create the illicit 
drug heroin,12 a dangerous substance responsible for 13,000 overdose deaths 
in 2015.13 
The road to heroin addiction today begins with legal prescription 
painkillers.  Individuals first become addicted to prescription pills and “move 
on to heroin when it becomes too difficult or expensive to access prescription 
 
 4. Christopher Ingraham, Prescription Painkillers More Widely Used Than Tobacco, 
Federal Study Finds, DENV. POST (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:14 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
2016/09/20/prescription-painkillers-tobacco-study/ [https://perma.cc/NEN7-J7U5]. 
 5. Christopher Ingraham, Heroin Deaths Surpass Gun Homicides for the First Time, 
CDC Data Shows, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2016/12/08/heroin-deaths-surpass-gun-homicides-for-the-first-time-cdc-data-
show/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPW-LAVG]. 
 6. This conclusion is based on statistics for 2014. DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, DEA-DCT-DIR-
001-17, 2016 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 25 (2016). 
 7. See Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—
United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm655051e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XNF-
SECW]. 
 8. Prescription Opioids, CAMH, https://www.camh.ca/en/health-info/mental-illness-and-
addiction-index/prescription-opioids [https://perma.cc/YLA7-UQBS] (last visited Nov. 15, 
2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence:  
Implications for Treatment, 1 SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., July 2002, at 13, 14–18. 
 11. Tony L. Yaksh & Mark S. Wallace, Opioids, Analgesia, and Pain Management, in 
GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 481, 483–84 
(Laurence L. Brunton ed., 12th ed. 2011); List of Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid 
Products Required to Have an Opioid REMS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm251735.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XY8V-U9X5] (last updated Nov. 24, 2017). 
 12. See Prescription Opioids, supra note 8. 
 13. See Rudd et al., supra note 7, at 1450 tbl.2. 
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opioids.”14  Whereas in the 1960s most opioid addicts began their addiction 
by injecting heroin, the average opioid addict today gets hooked by using 
prescription pills.15  One study found that 75 percent of high school heroin 
users begin their opioid addiction with prescription medications.16 
The opioid epidemic has created not only a health crisis, but also an 
economic burden on America.  From 2011 to 2015, the United States realized 
a 1000 percent increase in “professional charges and allowed amounts for 
services for patients diagnosed with opioid abuse or dependence.”17  In 2011, 
the societal cost of opioid abuse was an estimated $55.7 billion:  $25 billion 
in health-care costs (primarily excess medical and drug costs), $11.2 billion 
in lost earnings from premature death, $7.9 billion in lost productivity, and 
$5.1 billion in criminal justice expenditures.18  In 2016, the “monetized 
burden” of prescription drug abuse rose to $78.5 billion:  $28 billion in 
health-care costs, $21.5 billion for overdose treatment, $20 billion in lost 
productivity, and $7.7 billion in criminal justice expenditures.19  When 
converting the loss of life into monetary figures, the economic burden of the 
opioid epidemic is even higher.  A health-care specialist from Harvard 
Medical School calculated “that loss of life alone costs the economy an 
additional sum of between a hundred and a hundred and fifty billion dollars 
a year.”20 
One method that governments have used to recover the immense costs of 
the opioid crisis is to sue opioid companies for the economic harm that they 
have suffered as a result of opioid addiction.  Quite recently, the popularity 
of these direct-injury claims has increased exponentially:  cities, counties, 
 
 14. Bridget M. Kuehn, Driven by Prescription Drug Abuse, Heroin Use Increases Among 
Suburban and Rural Whites, 312 JAMA 118, 119 (2014). 
 15. Id.  The demographic of drug users in the United States has also changed—opioid 
addicts in the 1960s were mostly young, uneducated boys, living in heavily populated cities. 
Id. at 118–19.  The average addict today, however, is fairly well educated, not necessarily 
male, and becomes addicted in his or her midtwenties. Id. at 119. 
 16. CJ Arlotta, More Than 75% of High School Heroin Users Started with Prescription 
Opioids, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cjarlotta/2015/12/07/more-
than-75-of-high-school-heroin-users-started-with-prescription-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/LM 
H5-87T7]. 
 17. The Opioid Crisis:  Impact on Healthcare Services and Costs, FAIR HEALTH (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media2.fairhealth.org/infographic/asset/FH%20Infographic%20-
%20The%20Opioid%20Crisis-59724533a5ac5.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9WK-3FVD] (“An 
allowed amount is the maximum amount an insurer will pay for a covered health service.”). 
 18. Howard G. Birnbaum et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, 
Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657, 657–67 (2011). 
 19. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Costs of US Prescription Opioid Epidemic Estimated 
at $78.5 Billion, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2016/09/160914105756.htm [https://perma.cc/X7KK-XMFP].  It is important to note 
that the Lippincott study is a more conservative estimate than the Birnbaum study because it 
did not take into account the societal costs of lost earnings from premature death. Id.; see also 
Birnbaum et al., supra note 18, at 661. 
 20. These calculations take “a conservative estimate of twenty to thirty thousand opioid-
related deaths a year” and multiplies that figure “by five million dollars—a figure commonly 
used by insurance companies to value a human life.” Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Cost of the 
Opioid Crisis, NEW YORKER (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2017/09/18/the-cost-of-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/8PBV-9S4H]. 
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and states ravaged by the opioid epidemic are filing civil complaints against 
opioid manufacturers and distributors in increasing numbers.21  This Note 
explores the role of the direct-injury claim in the context of the opioid crisis, 
and why it is such a popular response.  Part I of this Note discusses the variety 
of responses that the government has implemented to prevent opioid 
addiction, facilitate addiction treatment, and punish the parties responsible 
for the opioid epidemic.  Part II focuses on direct-injury claims, a measure 
that seeks to punish the opioid manufacturers and distributors responsible for 
America’s opioid crisis by recovering damages spent on infrastructure and 
health care in response to the crisis.  Part II also explores the role of these 
direct-injury claims by noting the downfalls and challenges of other forms of 
civil litigation in the context of the opioid epidemic.  Part III then explains 
how direct-injury government-entity claims circumvent the obstacles that 
have hindered individual, class action, and parens patriae actions against 
opioid companies. 
I.  GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 
Every branch and level of government has been involved in the fight 
against opioid addiction.  To understand the distinct role played by direct-
injury government claims, one must see these lawsuits in the context of the 
full panoply of government efforts to deal with the opioid crisis.  These 
efforts can be split into two categories:  proactive and reactive.  Proactive 
measures aim to prevent American citizens from becoming addicted to 
prescription opioids in the first place.  Reactive responses aim to treat opioid 
addicts and punish the parties responsible for facilitating opioid addiction.  
Part I.A discusses proactive measures that attempt to limit the market for 
illicit medications through regulation of the legal prescription drug industry.  
Although proactive measures are arguably superior because they address the 
issue of addiction before it proliferates, the opioid epidemic has grown far 
too serious to rely solely on proactive responses.  Part I.B discusses reactive 
measures that aim to increase treatment options or penalize drug dealers, 
prescribers, and companies for facilitating opioid addiction. 
A.  Proactive Measures:  Preventing Addiction 
The prescription drug industry must be properly regulated to ensure that 
opioids are being used safely and only for medicinal purposes.  Congress has 
placed much of the responsibility for regulating prescription opioids in the 
hands of executive agencies.  Two agencies in particular, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are 
highly accountable for regulating the legal prescription drug industry.  The 
FDA is responsible for regulating prescription painkillers prior to their 
 
 21. See Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, Drugmakers and Distributors Face Barrage of 
Lawsuits over Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST (July 4, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/drugmakers-and-distributors-face-barrage-of-lawsuits-over-opioid-epidemic/ 
2017/07/04/3fc33c64-5794-11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html [https://perma.cc/5GLR-
MK6F]; infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
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entrance into the market, whereas the DEA regulates the manufacture, 
distribution, and possession of prescription medications once they are 
released to the public. 
The FDA derives its authority to regulate drugs from the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of 1938.22  The FDCA requires that the 
FDA approve every drug before it is manufactured or distributed in the 
United States.23  The FDA’s task involves a tough balance between giving 
needy patients a valuable medication, reducing prices, and fostering 
innovation on one hand and, on the other hand, encouraging safety and 
efficacy for companies that are otherwise disincentivized to do so.24  For 
example, when the FDA first approved OxyContin,25 members of the 
medical community were convinced that it had approved a “gift from nature”:  
a medication that provides patients long-term pain relief “with few side 
effects.”26  Once the agency understood the risk of opioid addiction and the 
misleading nature of Purdue Pharma’s advertisement scheme, its objective 
was to offset the danger by strengthening OxyContin’s warning label.27  
Since 2007, the FDA has erred on the side of safety and increased its 
regulation of prescription opioids by requiring prescription opioid 
manufacturers to undergo a three-tiered regulation process before releasing 
their drugs to the market.28 
The DEA serves as the primary enforcer of the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA).29  The statute requires all distributors and manufacturers of 
prescription opioids to generate a “closed system” of distribution and keep 
adequate records on the quantity of drugs being produced, purchased, and 
 
 22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–360fff-7 (2012). 
 23. Id. § 355(a). 
 24. Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of OxyContin:  The Case for Enhancing Liability 
for Off-Label Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 430–36 (2001).  Despite their complexity, these 
regulatory efforts are “inherently superior to tort liability because [they are] proactive rather 
than reactive.” Id. at 436. 
 25. The FDA first approved OxyContin, a controlled-release formula for oxycodone that 
“allowed dosing every 12 hours instead of every 4 to 6 hours” in 1995. Timeline of Selected 
FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter FDA Opioid Timeline], https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm [https://perma.cc/T2AJ-RQBY] (last visited Nov. 
15, 2018). 
 26. Patrick R. Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-
of-pain [https://perma.cc/S83V-VSHV] (quoting Dr. Russell Portenoy, a pain specialist, in 
1993). 
 27. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25. 
 28. This three-tiered system is known as the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy. 
Hilary Homenko, Note, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation:  A Prescription for the FDA’s Next 
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 
273, 275 (2012). 
 29. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL:  AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
ACT 4 (2006), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/ 
pract_manual012508.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF9C-VK4Q]. 
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sold in the United States.30  Under authority from the CSA, the DEA 
promulgated Rule 1301.74, which requires all distributors to “design and 
operate a system to disclose . . . suspicious orders of controlled substances.”31  
In addition to reporting these suspicious orders, distributors must prevent 
diversion to illegitimate outlets by “conduct[ing] an independent analysis of 
suspicious orders prior to completing a sale.”32  The DEA administers, 
enforces, and sets detailed regulations in line with the CSA.  It has the ability, 
for example, to set “quantity and production” quotas for drug manufacturers 
and penalize any distributors that fail to adhere to Rule 1301.74.33 
Opioid manufacturers and distributors are just one part of the distribution 
chain.  In addition to regulating their conduct, the government must also 
regulate the parties that provide medications directly to patients:  the opioid 
prescribers.  A subset of the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is responsible for setting federal 
guidelines aimed specifically at opioid prescription.34  Each state also has its 
own statutory structure for monitoring prescription medications and separate 
licensing requirements for physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies.35  Some 
states particularly afflicted by the opioid epidemic have added restrictions on 
a physician or pharmacy’s ability to dispense prescription medication.  
Florida, for example, has completely banned doctors from prescribing 
oxycodone on-site.36  This measure has decreased the number of oxycodone 
doses purchased in the state by 97 percent.37 
By regulating the legal prescription drug industry, the government 
effectively limits the market for illicit prescription opioids.  However, as the 
illicit market for opioids kept growing despite regulatory efforts, state 
 
 30. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 4; see also COMM. ON PAIN MGMT. & 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS PRESCRIPTION OPIOID ABUSE, PAIN MANAGEMENT AND 
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC:  BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 32 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458660/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK458660.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KLA-PFPD]. 
 31. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b) (2018).  Suspicious orders are characterized by unusual size, 
frequency, or significant deviations from “normal pattern.” Id. 
 32. Letter from Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Office of Diversion 
Control, to Cardinal Health (Dec. 27, 2007) (emphasis added).  This letter was filed as an 
attachment to the government’s motion papers in Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder.  See 
Attachment 5 to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2012), ECF No. 14-8. 
 33. Melissa Ferrara, Comment, The Disparate Treatment of Addiction-Assistance 
Medications and Opiate Pain Medications Under the Law:  Permitting the Proliferation of 
Opiates and Limiting Access to Treatment, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 741, 746 (2012). 
 34. See, e.g., CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/guidelines_at-a-glance-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML 
W2-7USK] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 35. See Aaron Gilson & David E. Joranson, Controlled Substances, Medical Practice, and 
the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE:  THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE 
MEDIA, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THERAPIES 173, 181–82 (Harold I. Schwartz ed., 
1994). 
 36. Lizette Alvarez, Florida Shutting ‘Pill Mill’ Clinics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/us/01drugs.html [https://perma.cc/F4BH-VHAB]. 
 37. Id. 
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legislatures began taking a more targeted approach by focusing on the 
methods that opioid addicts frequently use to obtain illicit medications.  The 
two most prominent methods are “doctor shopping” and “pill mills.”  Doctor 
shopping occurs when a single patient seeks multiple treatment providers to 
illicitly procure prescription medications.38  The objective behind doctor 
shopping is “to obtain the maximum amount of pills without the medical 
community becoming wise to the scheme.”39  Drug abusers also commonly 
obtain large amounts of prescription pills through so-called pill mills:  
doctors, clinics, or pharmacies that inappropriately prescribe or dispense 
prescription medications, often in large quantities.40  The most popular state 
solution to address both these issues has been the creation of prescription 
monitoring programs (PMPs):  systems that track every prescription 
medication being dispensed throughout the state and “make it easier for law 
enforcement agencies to identify pill mills [and doctor-shopping activity] 
without adversely affecting legitimate pain clinics that properly prescribe 
controlled medications.”41  Every state aside from Missouri has enacted a 
PMP program, and these have “proven effective in helping reduce [the] 
availability, abuse, and diversion of illicitly obtained prescription drugs.”42  
Unfortunately, PMPs and other reactive measures are insufficient to prevent 
American citizens from becoming addicted to prescription opioids.  
Therefore, it is necessary for the government to pursue reactive measures that 
accept opioid addiction as a reality of American culture and aim to lower the 
societal cost of the crisis. 
B.  Reactive Measures:  Treatment, Punishment, and Retribution 
There are a variety of reactive measures that American government entities 
have pursued to address opioid addiction after it afflicts individuals.  In line 
with the perspective that opioid addiction is a medical problem rather than a 
crime,43 many reactive measures seek to increase opioid-addiction treatment 
options for addicted individuals.44  The alternative is a penal approach, which 
 
 38. Randy A. Sansone & Lori A. Sansone, Doctor Shopping:  A Phenomenon of Many 
Themes, 9 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 42, 42–43 (2012). 
 39. Amy L. Cadwell, In the War on Prescription Drug Abuse, E-Pharmacies Are Making 
Doctor Shopping Irrelevant, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 85, 90 (2007). 
 40. Pia Malbran, What’s a Pill Mill?, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2007), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-a-pill-mill/ [https://perma.cc/6S29-P34S]. 
 41. Ed Woodworth, Note, Pharmageddon:  A Statutory Solution to Curb Ohio’s 
Prescription Abuse Problem, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 121 (2013) (discussing Ohio’s 
implementation of prescription monitoring). 
 42. See DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, supra note 6, at 26.  Thirty-three of the forty-nine states 
that utilize PMPs share prescription data among themselves using an InterConnect system 
created by the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy. Id. 
 43. Treating Opioid Addiction as a Chronic Illness, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., 
https://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/cmm-fact-sheet---11-07-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2XZ-7355] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 44. Some commentators have argued that, unlike other forms of drug addiction, opioid 
addiction is more likely to be viewed as a medical problem rather than a crime because it 
afflicts mostly white individuals. See German Lopez, When a Drug Epidemic’s Victims Are 
White, VOX (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/4/4/15098746/opioid-
2018] LITIGATING THE OPIOID CRISIS 1149 
addresses on the criminal and tortious conduct by parties that facilitate opioid 
addiction through criminal prosecutions and civil litigation, respectively. 
1.  Increase of Treatment Options 
Congress and various bureaucratic agencies have worked to facilitate the 
treatment of opioid use disorder (OUD)45 and addiction.  Well before the 
opioid epidemic, Congress passed the Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act of 
1974 (NATA)46 and the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA)47 
to increase addiction and overdose treatment options for opioid users.48  
Congress has also provided huge grants to state governments for substance 
abuse treatment.49  Around 32 percent of all state funding for substance abuse 
problems comes from a 1992 block grant from the federal government.50  In 
2016, the federal government set aside an extra $1 billion for states to 
administer and create treatment and recovery programs for opioid users.51 
State legislatures have also done their part by increasing access to overdose 
or addiction treatments,52 decreasing liability for physicians prescribing 
 
heroin-epidemic-race [https://perma.cc/VR6P-NJDE]; Jesse Mechanic, When a Drug 
Epidemic Hit White America, Addiction Became a Disease, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/when-a-drug-epidemic-hit-white-america-addiction-
became_us_5963a588e4b08f5c97d06b9a [https://perma.cc/3F3K-28AJ]. 
 45. The CDC defines opioid use disorder as “[a] problematic pattern of opioid use that 
causes significant impairment or distress” characterized by “unsuccessful efforts to cut down 
or control use, or use resulting in social problems and a failure to fulfill obligations at work, 
school, or home.” Commonly Used Terms, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ 
opioids/terms.html [https://perma.cc/K3CW-YLMJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 46. Narcotics Addiction Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 Stat. 124 (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 823, 827 (2012)).  The Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act formally 
recognized “the practice of using opioids to treat opioid addiction.” Corey S. Davis & Derek 
H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and 
Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 17 (2017).  For almost fifty years prior to the 
enactment of NATA, it was illegal to prescribe methadone or other opioids as a treatment for 
drug-dependent individuals. Id. 
 47. DATA enabled physicians to prescribe narcotics for opioid addiction treatment, which 
opened up a broader range of treatment options for opioid users alienated by the idea of 
attending drug treatment clinics. See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
310, § 3502(a)(5), 114 Stat. 1222, 1223–27 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (2012)). 
 48. The main issue with DATA was its limitation on the number of patients a practice can 
treat simultaneously:  thirty. Id. § 3502(a)(5), 114 Stat. at 1223.  Even large clinics with plenty 
of physicians were restricted by DATA’s thirty-patient limitation. Id.  Over time, the 
Department of Health and Human Services fixed this problem by promulgating rules that 
expanded the number of persons a single practice could treat simultaneously, raising the limit 
in 2016 to 275. 42 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2017). 
 49. Addressing the Opioid Crisis in America:  Prevention, Treatment and Recovery:  
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related 
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 7–10 (2017) (written testimony of 
Francis Collins, Elinore McCance-Katz & Debra Houry, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.) 
(discussing the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grants of 1992). 
 50. Id. at 8. 
 51. The 21st Century Cures Act set aside $1 billion “in funding over 2 years for grants to 
states targeting opioid prevention and treatment activities.” COMM. ON PAIN MGMT. & 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS PRESCRIPTION OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 30, at 29. 
 52. In the past, states imposed barriers that prevented laypersons from accessing 
overdose-reversing drugs, by, for example, restricting doctors from prescribing naloxone “for 
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overdose-treatment drugs,53 and providing legal immunity to bystanders who 
assist during overdoses.54  By 2016, forty-seven states had passed legislation 
that does one or more of the following:  (1) provides immunity to prescribers 
of overdose treatments such as naloxone;55 (2) permits doctors to make third-
party prescriptions of overdose treatments to friends, family, or 
acquaintances of an overdosing patient;56 or (3) authorizes trained responders 
to administer naloxone “if they believe[] someone [i]s experiencing a drug 
overdose.”57  Furthermore, all of these forty-seven states have passed some 
form of a Good Samaritan law that grants either reduced liability or complete 
“immunity to individuals who summon emergency aid in the event of an 
overdose.”58 
The FDA has employed its regulatory authority to authorize abuse-
deterrent opioids,59 medications that prevent OUD,60 and drugs that reverse 
overdoses.61  Furthermore, the FDA has had an important role (either on its 
own or with other agencies) researching the effects of opioid use and 
educating the public about substance abuse problems.62  These treatment 
measures are complemented by reactive measures that focus on penalizing 
wrongful actions rather than assisting addicted persons. 
2.  Criminal Prosecutions 
State and federal governments criminally prosecute any party responsible 
for facilitating the opioid epidemic—whether it be street dealers, doctors, or 
huge pharmaceutical companies.63  Although the federal government and 
most states have chosen to view opioid addiction as an illness by focusing 
more on addiction treatment, some states are reinvigorating a “tough on 
crime” approach to deter drug dealers.  Kentucky, for example, has recently 
increased penalties for heroin trafficking,64 and Florida has enacted a law that 
 
persons other than the person to whom they are to be administered (a process referred to as 
third-party prescription) or to a person the physician has not personally examined.” Davis & 
Carr, supra note 46, at 29.  By 2016, however, almost all states had modified their laws to 
“improve layperson naloxone access.” Id. at 30. 
 53. Id. at 30–32. 
 54. Id. at 33. 
 55. Id. at 30–32. 
 56. Id. at 31. 
 57. Daniel Rees et al., With a Little Help from My Friends:  The Effects of Naloxone 
Access and Good Samaritan Laws on Opioid-Related Deaths, 78 RES. BRIEFS ECON. POL’Y, 
June 2017, at 1, 1. 
 58. Davis & Carr, supra note 46, at 33. 
 59. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25 (noting that on July 23, 2014, the FDA 
approved Targiniq ER, an abuse-deterrent, extended-release pain reliever).  In 2013, the FDA 
went beyond its role of authorization and actually assisted the opioid industry in creating new 
abuse-deterrent opioids. Id. 
 60. The FDA “has approved three medications for the treatment of OUD:  methadone, 
buprenorphine, and naltrexone.” Davis & Carr, supra note 46, at 13. 
 61. Id. at 28. 
 62. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25. 
 63. See DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, supra note 6, at 28–40. 
 64. KY. REV. STAT. ch. 218A (2018). 
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charges drug dealers with murder if their customers overdose on opioids.65  
The DEA takes a similar “tough on crime” approach.  In 2001, it initiated a 
plan to “investigate and prosecute doctors for improper prescribing of 
OxyContin.”66  Federal prosecutors have used a variety of liability theories 
to sue physicians, ranging from unlawful distribution of controlled 
substances resulting in death67 to money laundering.68  From 1998 to 2006, 
there were a total of 986 lawsuits against physicians “involving the 
prescribing of opioid analgesics.”69  About 80 percent of the physicians “pled 
guilty or no contest to at least one of the criminal charges brought against 
them.”70 
Prosecutors also target pharmacists who illegally distribute prescription 
opioids.  Of particular interest are internet “e-pharmacies” that have the 
ability to dispense millions of prescription pills and evade regulatory 
mechanisms implemented by states.71  United States v. Tobin72 featured an 
attack on one such internet pharmacy, Jive Network, which connected 
consumers to doctors who spent under ten seconds reviewing orders and 
filled thousands of prescriptions without hesitation.73  The DEA also 
collaborates with federal prosecutors to bring cases against opioid 
manufacturers and distributors.  In 2002, the U.S. Attorney for the Western 
District of Virginia began a criminal investigation focused on Purdue’s 
misbranding of OxyContin.74  The investigation culminated in a guilty plea 
by Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., the manufacturer of OxyContin at the 
time.  Purdue and three of its top executives were forced to pay “more than 
$600 million to federal and state agencies.”75  Civil lawsuits filed by 
 
 65. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (2018). 
 66. Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug 
Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1157–58 (2014). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 556 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 
475 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321–22 (D.P.R. 2007). 
 69. Donald M. Goldenbaum et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid Analgesic-
Prescribing Offenses, 9 PAIN MED. 737, 741–43 (2008). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Some critics argue that “e-pharmacies” render doctor shopping irrelevant by giving 
opioid addicts a quick and easy method to obtain illicit prescription medications. See Cadwell, 
supra note 39, at 107–16. 
 72. 676 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 73. Id. at 1271. 
 74. Purdue had engaged in deceptive sales techniques:  training their sales representatives 
“to make false representations to health care providers” and claiming that OxyContin was 
difficult to abuse, less addictive and less euphoric than other opioids, lacked withdrawal 
symptoms, and provided “fewer peaks and valleys” than other opioids. Paul D. Frederickson, 
Criminal Marketing:  Corporate and Managerial Liability in the Prescription Drug Industry, 
22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 137 (2008).  All these assertions were false. Id. 
 75. Id. at 115.  “After their pleas, the Department of Health and Human Services barred 
the three [Purdue executives] for 20 years from doing business with Medicare or other 
taxpayer-financed health care program[s].” Barry Meier, Ruling Is Upheld Against Executives 
Tied to Oxycontin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/ 
business/16purdue.html [https://perma.cc/BN8R-2BMM]. 
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individuals and class actions were a great help to DEA officials; information 
gathered during those early lawsuits was utilized to convict the opioid 
companies.76 
Whereas criminal actions against opioid manufacturers are focused on 
alleged misrepresentations and deceptive marketing, criminal actions against 
opioid distributors are focused on a lack of oversight and violations of the 
Controlled Substances Act.  The DEA penalizes those distributors that fail to 
adhere to the regulations set forth in the CSA.77  For example, in 2007, the 
DEA issued an immediate suspension order (ISO) and fined Cardinal Health 
$34 million for failing to prevent (or notify the DEA) of its hydrocodone 
distribution to illegitimate internet pharmacies.78 
3.  Civil Lawsuits 
In addition to criminal prosecutions, there have been many civil lawsuits 
filed against opioid companies by governments seeking to recover damages 
resulting from the opioid epidemic.  Although the viability of the tort theories 
has not been tested in court, the rise in settlement figures over the years 
indicates the growing success of such lawsuits.79  In 2004, Purdue settled 
with West Virginia for a small sum of $10 million.80  West Virginia was 
required to use the proceeds from settlement to fund programs that further 
educate doctors, encourage drug prevention, or facilitate drug 
rehabilitation.81 
This settlement motivated twenty-six other states to bring suit in 2007, 
which culminated with a $19.5 million settlement in the states’ favor.82  In 
addition, the settlement required Purdue to (1) “market and promote 
 
 76. “Then, as Hanly [a prominent lawyer that lead civil trials against Purdue Pharma] tells 
it, the Justice Department caught wind of the civil litigation and asked if he would help with 
a budding criminal investigation into Purdue.  Hanly was happy to assist.” Andrew Joseph, A 
Veteran New York Litigator Is Taking on Opioid Makers:  They Have a History, STAT NEWS 
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/10/opioid-lawsuits-paul-hanly/ 
[https://perma.cc/TA35-BA8L]. 
 77. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 78. “In December 2007, DEA issued an ISO at the location as a result of its distribution 
of hydrocodone to ‘rogue’ internet pharmacies.  That action, and similar actions at other 
Cardinal Health facilities across the United States, resulted in a $34 million fine.” Press 
Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., DEA Suspends for Two Years Pharmaceutical Distributor’s 
Ability to Sell Controlled Substances from Lakeland, Florida Facility (May 15, 2012), 
https://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr051512.html [https://perma.cc/ANE3-5VN2]. 
 79. See Ausness, supra note 66, at 1149. 
 80. Christopher R. Page, Comment, These Statements Have Not Been Approved by the 
FDA:  Improving the Postapproval Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 88 OR. L. REV. 1189, 
1205 (2009). 
 81. See Frederickson, supra note 74, at 134. 
 82. The states were permitted to allocate their share of the $19.5 million as they each saw 
fit. John O’Brien, Purdue Pharma Settles Multi-State Marketing Claim, LEGAL NEWS LINE 
(May 8, 2007), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510518258-purdue-pharma-settles-multi-
state-marketing-claim [https://perma.cc/HVZ7-7GAC]; see Press Release, Wash. State Office 
of the Att’y Gen., Washington to Receive Share of $19.5 Million Settlement with OxyContin 
Maker (May 8, 2007), http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/washington-receive-share-
195-million-settlement-oxycontin-maker [https://perma.cc/ZYQ6-CQ8W]. 
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OxyContin in a manner consistent with its package insert and not in a manner 
that minimizes the approved uses for the drug”; (2) refrain from “market[ing] 
or promot[ing OxyContin] for off-label uses”;83 (3) ensure that any person or 
entity receiving funding from Purdue disclose the source of that funding; 
(4) refrain from “sponsoring or funding any educational events” if the 
speaker recommends off-label uses of OxyContin; (5) refrain from paying 
bonuses to salespersons that are contingent upon the volume of OxyContin 
sold; and (6) “make sure that prescriber education about OxyContin and its 
potential for abuse and diversion is a component of the evaluations of Purdue 
sales representatives.”84 
Also in 2007, the state of Kentucky and the government of Pike County, 
Kentucky, sued Purdue Pharma for alleged misrepresentations regarding the 
highly addictive nature of OxyContin.85  Pike County alone settled with 
Purdue for $4 million in 2013.86  The state of Kentucky settled with Purdue 
for $24 million in 2015—$13.5 million more than Purdue’s offer to the state 
in 2007.87  Around the time that Pike County settled with the opioid 
manufacturer, California began its litigation against Purdue Pharma.  
California joined other manufacturers of prescription opioids besides Purdue 
and alleged damages resulting from negligent and deceptive marketing in the 
form of downplaying the risks of opioid painkillers.88  One of the named 
defendants in the lawsuit, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,89 settled its claims 
in 2017 by agreeing to pay $1.6 million.90 
Government entities have also targeted distributors of prescription opioids.  
In 2012, West Virginia’s Attorney General (AG) sued Cardinal Health and 
AmerisourceBergen (two of the three leading distributors of prescription 
opioids in America)91 for their failure to monitor suspicious orders, which 
 
 83. Off-label uses are “those purposes beyond the FDA-approved indications and uses of 
the drug.” Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Madigan Reaches Agreement with 
Pharmaceutical Company over Its Promotion of Pain Reliever OxyContin (May 8, 2007), 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2007_05/20070508.html [http://perma.cc/ 
D52A-RVBH]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ausness, supra note 66, at 1149–50. 
 86. Id. at 1156. 
 87. Verdict and Settlement Summary, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, No. 07-CI-
01303 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015), 2015 WL 10458550; see also Kentucky Settles Lawsuit 
with OxyContin Maker for $24 Million, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015, 5:11 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-settles-lawsuit-with-oxycontin-maker-for-24-
million/ [https://perma.cc/MDR4-3PS2]. 
 88. See Complaint for Violations of California False Advertising Law, California Unfair 
Competition Law, and Public Nuisance, Seeking Restituion, Civil Penalties, Abatement, and 
Injunctive Relief, California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 8:14-CV-1080-JLS DFM, 2014 WL 
6065907 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No. 1-1. 
 89. Teva manufactures, sells, and distributes the prescription opioids Actiq and Fentora. 
Id. at 8. 
 90. Nate Raymond, Teva to Pay $1.6 Million to Resolve California Counties’ Opioid 
Case, REUTERS (May 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-teva/teva-
to-pay-1-6-million-to-resolve-california-counties-opioid-case-idUSL1N1IR1W3 
[https://perma.cc/U72S-GFJV]. 
 91. McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and AmerisourceBergen Drug 
Corporation are considered the “Big 3” of opioid distribution, “dominat[ing] 85 percent of the 
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facilitated the operation of pill mills throughout the state.92  West Virginia 
sued for violations of the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, and the West 
Virginia Antitrust Act; the state also asserted public nuisance and negligence 
claims.93  In 2016, both Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen settled with 
West Virginia for $36 million.94 
That same year, Cardinal Health entered into yet another huge settlement.  
This time Cardinal settled to “resolv[e] the outstanding civil penalty portion 
of the company’s 2012 administrative settlement with the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency.”95  The $44 million settlement was made with the 
federal prosecutors in the Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of 
New York, the District of Maryland, and the Western District of 
Washington.96  Cardinal’s New York distribution center, for example, failed 
to report more than twenty highly suspicious orders to the DEA.97  The next 
year, another distributor of opioid analgesics, Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals, 
entered into a similar settlement for its failure to report suspicious orders of 
oxycodone products.  Mallinckrodt reached a $35 million settlement with the 
DEA, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Northern District of New 
 
market share for the distribution of prescription opioids.” Complaint at 5, City of Birmingham 
v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-01360-JEO (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2017), ECF 
No. 1; see also Adam J. Fein, 2016 MDM Market Leaders:  Top Pharmaceutical Distributors, 
MDM, http://www.mdm.com/2016-top-pharmaceuticals-distributors [http://perma.cc/CV2B-
PT4W] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“Three companies account for about 85 percent to 90 
percent of all revenues from drug distribution in the United States:  AmerisourceBergen 
Corporation (NYSE:ABC), Cardinal Health, Inc. (NYSE:CAH) and McKesson Corporation 
(NYSE:MCK).”). 
 92. See Complaint at 7–8, West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 
A212-CV-3836, 2013 WL 1305647 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No. 1-1. 
 93. See id. at 8–22. 
 94. See Charles Ornstein, Drug Distributors Penalized for Turning Blind Eye in Opioid 
Epidemic, NPR (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
2017/01/27/511858862/drug-distributors-penalized-for-turning-blind-eye-in-opioid-
epidemic [https://perma.cc/QD2U-NLGR] (“That’s on top of another $20 million that 
Cardinal Health agreed this month to pay the state of West Virginia, which has been among 
the hardest hit by opioid overdoses.  Other distributors have also agreed to pay smaller 
amounts to West Virginia within the past few months.  AmerisourceBergen, for instance, will 
pay $16 million.”); Press Release, Cardinal Health, Cardinal Health Reaches Settlement with 
West Virginia (Jan. 9, 2017), http://ir.cardinalhealth.com/news/press-release-details/2017/ 
Cardinal-Health-Reaches-Settlement-With-West-Virginia/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/R4 
Y6-DFYH] (“Under the terms of the settlement, Cardinal Health has agreed to pay $20 million 
to the State of West Virginia to resolve these issues, and the State has released the company 
from any further actions.”). 
 95. Press Release, Cardinal Health, Cardinal Health Announces Civil Settlement with 
DOJ (Dec. 23, 2016), http://ir.cardinalhealth.com/news/press-release-details/2016/ 
CARDINAL-HEALTH-ANNOUNCES-CIVIL-SETTLEMENT-WITH-DOJ/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/25QP-3DZW]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $10 Million 
Civil Penalty Recovery Against New York Pharmaceutical Distributor Kinray, Llc. (Dec. 23, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-10-million-
civil-penalty-recovery-against-new-york [https://perma.cc/4TDJ-Y23F]. 
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York.98  The “groundbreaking” aspect of this settlement was that it 
prospectively required Mallinckrodt to utilize its discounting system99 as a 
monitoring device for suspicious orders.100 
Recently, there has been an explosion of lawsuits by government entities 
targeting opioid companies for their role in the opioid epidemic.101  In 
Kentucky alone, twenty-four counties have sued opioid-industry defendants, 
alleging harms caused by the three major opioid distributors in the country:  
Amerisource, Cardinal Health, and McKesson.102  The sheer number of 
claims prompted calls for multidistrict litigation,103 which led to a 
consolidation of over one hundred opioid lawsuits.104  These civil actions 
target a broad range of parties:  opioid distributors,105 opioid 
manufacturers,106 pharmacies,107 state pharmacy boards,108 and 
physicians.109  Overall, however, the focus seems to be on the companies that 
 
 98. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mallinckrodt Agrees to Pay Record $35 Million 
Settlement for Failure to Report Suspicious Orders of Pharmaceutical Drugs and for 
Recordkeeping Violations (July 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mallinckrodt-
agrees-pay-record-35-million-settlement-failure-report-suspicious-orders [https://perma.cc/ 
VK6L-HWZU]. 
 99. Many manufacturers, including Mallinckrodt, offer discounts or “chargebacks” to 
their downstream consumers who purchase the most oxycodone. Id.  As part of Mallinckrodt’s 
settlement, the company was required to use its existing chargeback system “to monitor and 
report to DEA suspicious sales of oxycodone.” Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Complaint, Fiscal Court v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 4:17-CV-
00120-JMH-HBB (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Union County 
Complaint]; Complaint, Illinois v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00876 (S.D. 
Ill. Aug. 17, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Illinois Complaint]; Complaint, City of 
Birmingham v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-01360-JEO (N.D. Ala. Aug. 
14, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint, County of San Joaquin v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17-
CV-01485-MCE-GGH (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter San Joaquin 
Complaint]; Complaint, Kanawha Cty. Comm’n v. Rite Aid of Md., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01666 
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Kanawha County Complaint]; Complaint, 
City of Everett v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17-CV-00209-RSM (W.D. Wash. Feb 10, 
2017), ECF No. 1-1 [Everett Complaint]. 
 102. See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1407 for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings at 20, In re Nat’l 
Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017), ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter 
MDL Brief]; Complaint, Fiscal Court v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 1:17-OP-
45031-DAP (E.D. Ky. Sep. 20, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Fiscal Court v. 
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-CV-557-TBR (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF 
No. 1; Union County Complaint, supra note 101. 
 103. MDL Brief, supra note 102, at 20; Sara Randazzo, Washington State Joins Legal 
Challenges over Opioids, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/washington-state-joins-legal-challenges-over-opioids-1506624009 [https://perma.cc/ 
4GU4-5D9M]. 
 104. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Complaint, City of Parma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17-CV-1872 (N.D. Ohio 
Aug. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Parma Complaint]. 
 107. See Kanawha County Complaint, supra note 101. 
 108. See Complaint, Cty. Comm’n v. W. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:17-CV-3366 (S.D.W. 
Va. June 22, 2017), ECF No. 1-1. 
 109. See Parma Complaint, supra note 106. 
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are profiting the most from opioid addiction—the manufacturers and 
distributors of prescription opioids. 
State AGs have sued firearm, lead paint, automobile, and tobacco 
companies in the past using similar tactics.  The lawsuits against the tobacco 
industry led to the “largest legal settlement in United States history”110—a 
settlement with an actual value of over $210 billion between forty-six states 
and six tobacco manufacturers (known as the “Master Settlement 
Agreement”).111  But even compared to the tobacco litigation, the current 
opioid litigation is unparalleled.  Whereas in the tobacco litigation only states 
and a few government subdivisions sued tobacco companies,112 in the opioid 
litigation, there is a “profusion of county and municipal plaintiffs.”113  There 
is also a larger and more diverse group of defendants in the current opioid 
litigation than in the tobacco litigation.  The tobacco litigation involved only 
six major manufacturers whereas the opioid litigation involves “at least 20 
opioid manufacturers and 13 distributors” as well as local pharmacies, 
physicians, and pharmacy boards.114  Perhaps the most interesting aspect of 
the opioid litigation, however, is the fact that so many claims are focused on 
direct injury to the government’s interests rather than the interests of citizens 
or consumers. 
II.  DIRECT-INJURY GOVERNMENT-ENTITY LAWSUITS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 
Government-entity lawsuits against opioid companies are reactive 
responses that seek to recover damages incurred from the opioid epidemic.  
These lawsuits employ a wide variety of liability theories that take the form 
of either parens patriae claims on behalf of the citizenry or direct-injury 
claims on behalf of the government itself.  The lawsuits generally target 
opioid manufacturers for alleged misrepresentations during advertisement115 
or opioid distributors for an alleged failure to monitor illicit distribution.116  
Most importantly, these lawsuits have the potential to avoid the pitfalls of 
other forms of civil litigation. 
A.  What Is a Direct-Injury Claim? 
When initiated by a party other than the government, a direct-injury claim 
is simple:  a plaintiff’s personal interests (e.g., health or property) have been 
 
 110. Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Forfeiting Federalism:  The Faustian Pact with Big Tobacco, 
18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 291, 292 (2015). 
 111. Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the 
Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2010). 
 112. There were “only a few governmental subdivisions [that] sued [tobacco companies] 
when their state attorneys general refused to join the litigation.” Richard Scruggs, Are Opioids 
the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2017, 11:04 AM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/962715 [https://perma.cc/7JSX-WCRT]. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See infra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 116. See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
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injured by a third party and the plaintiff seeks to recover damages flowing 
from that injury.  In the context of government-entity lawsuits, however, the 
distinction between direct-injury claims and parens patriae claims has 
caused undue confusion.117  Both of these terms relate to the damages 
asserted by the plaintiff and describe whether the damages are asserted on 
behalf of the citizens (parens patriae) or on behalf of the government itself 
(direct injury). 
Parens patriae directly translates to “parent of the nation,” and the name 
is derived from the king’s duty “‘to take care of his subjects as are legally 
unable’ to care for themselves . . . including children and those afflicted by 
mental infirmity, as well as the oversight of charitable trusts.”118  The modern 
American parens patriae claim can be asserted by cities, counties, and states 
but is not limited to “children and those afflicted by mental infirmity.”119  
Parens patriae standing cannot be invoked by cities or counties because they 
are not considered sovereigns;120 municipalities must pair their parens 
patriae claims with direct-injury claims to satisfy standing requirements.  To 
assert a parens patriae claim, the government entity must prove that it is 
“more than a nominal party” in the suit—meaning that the government must 
prove injury to its own interests and not just the interests of a small group of 
citizens.121  There must be an injury to a “quasi-sovereign” interest of the 
state:  “an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties,” which 
involves either a wide-sweeping injury to “the health and well-being—both 
physical and economic—of its residents in general” or a violation of the 
state’s right to “not be[] discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the 
federal system.”122 
 
 117. This complex distinction has led even federal judges to confuse the two types of 
claims. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962–63 (E.D. Tex. 1997) 
(evaluating standing for a direct-injury claim by the state of Texas under the quasi-sovereign 
interest test as if the claim was parens patriae); Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae:  An Overview, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1853 n.39 (2000) (“It is not entirely clear to me why the parens doctrine 
was important in [Texas v. American Tobacco Co.], as it was brought by the State of Texas 
for its own damages.”). 
 118. Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU 
L. REV. 759, 769 (2016) (quoting JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE 
PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 155 
(1820)).  The “Universal Sovereignty Theory” involves the belief that the American parens 
patriae doctrine is derived directly from the old king’s authority. See id. at 769–84.  Although 
some prominent American parens patriae cases claim roots in the Universal Sovereignty 
Theory, the parens patriae doctrine invoked by government entities today originates from an 
American doctrine that echoes similar themes to the king’s notion of parens patriae but lacks 
direct relation. See id. 
 119. Id. at 769.  In fact, the first American parens patriae case involved government entities 
suing on behalf of charities that lacked an appointed guardian. See generally Vidal v. Girard’s 
Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). 
 120. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of 
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 368 & n.54 (2006). 
 121. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). 
 122. Id. 
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Parens patriae claims are distinct from direct-injury claims, where the 
government asserts injury to itself.  In Massachusetts v. EPA,123 a parens 
patriae lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its 
failure to properly regulate greenhouse gases, the U.S. Supreme Court made 
clear that “a claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an allegation 
of direct injury.”124  When the state itself has been injured by tortious 
conduct, there is no need to assert a parens patriae claim because the state 
“can directly vindicate its interests as fully as any other litigant.”125 
In the case of the opioid litigation, it is easy to imagine every claim as 
being both parens patriae and direct injury.  If the government entity alleges 
damages to its treasury (due to, for example, medical costs and infrastructure 
costs expended upon opioid addicts) or lost tax revenue due to lost 
productivity from addiction,126 then there is quite clearly injury to the state’s 
proprietary interests.127  That same government entity can easily reword its 
argument to make a parens patriae assertion.  For example, the government 
can argue that large numbers of consumers have been tricked by opioid 
manufacturers’ claims or that its citizens are endangered by the prevalence 
of opioid addiction across communities and allege injury to “the health and 
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general,” 
thereby establishing a viable parens patriae claim.128  For this reason, many 
states and counties assert both direct-injury and parens patriae claims (or 
parens patriae standing) in the ongoing opioid litigation.129  One could view 
direct-injury claims as a worse, better, or equivalent substitute for parens 
patriae claims when battling opioid companies.  Direct-injury claims in the 
 
 123. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 124. Id. at 538; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448–51 (1992). 
 125. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the 
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1882 (2000). 
 126. Many of the nuisance claims brought by government entities allege damages based on 
law enforcement and health services expenditures. See, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra 
note 101; Complaint, Hocking Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 
2:17-CV-00769-GCS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2017), ECF No. 1; Illinois Complaint, supra 
note 101. 
 127. See 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.60(4)(b)–(c) (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2018) (distinguishing direct injury to a state’s propriety interests from parens 
patriae injury to quasi-sovereign interests). 
 128. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 
(1982). 
 129. See, e.g., Illinois Complaint, supra note 101 (asserting “recovery for [the state’s] own 
harm” throughout the complaint but also claiming parens patriae standing); San Joaquin 
Complaint, supra note 101 (asserting damages to the state’s proprietary interests and then 
incorporating all of its claims on behalf of its citizens through parens patriae); Complaint at 
14, City of Dayton v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 3:17-CV-00229-TMR (S.D. Ohio July 10, 
2017), ECF No. 3 [hereinafter Dayton Complaint] (“Plaintiff brings this action on its own 
behalf and also as a subrogee of its employees and residents . . . .” (emphasis added)).  In 
Staubus v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., the attorneys general for three judicial districts of Tennessee 
asserted direct injury to the government entities’ interests but also brought a creative parens 
patriae claim on behalf of all the babies in those districts who were born addicted to opioids 
as a result of manufacturers’ allegedly negligent marketing. Complaint, Staubus v. Purdue 
Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17-CV-00122 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2017), ECF No. 1-1. 
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context of the opioid epidemic come in two forms:  false or misleading 
advertising claims and failure to monitor claims. 
B.  Different Types of Direct-Injury Lawsuits 
Direct-injury government-entity lawsuits against opioid manufacturers 
and distributors employ a variety of liability theories and can be categorized 
into two types of claims, based on the defendant’s identity and allegedly 
tortious conduct.  The first type of claim is generally made against 
manufacturers for misleading marketing.130  The second type of claim is 
generally made against distributors for a failure to monitor suspicious 
orders.131  Some lawsuits include both types of claims in their complaint.132 
For both types of claims, the government asserts that the defendants 
performed a wrongful act and that, as a result, the plaintiff (the government 
itself) suffered damages.  The distinguishing features between each type of 
claim is the asserted act and the set of named defendants.  For the first type 
of claim, the wrongful conduct is the misrepresentation that occurs when 
defendants disseminate false or misleading information regarding the risks 
or benefits of prescription opioids.133  Thus, these claims target the 
companies responsible for marketing and advertising prescription opioids, 
usually prescription opioid manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma, Teva, 
Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.134  
For the second type of claim, the wrongful conduct is an alleged failure to 
monitor, otherwise known as “diversion,” which “charg[es] that the 
defendants breached duties to secure the distribution chain from diversion of 
large quantities of opioid-containing prescription drugs to criminals.”135  The 
“diversion theory was not used in the tobacco litigation and seems to be 
unique to the opioid cases.”136  These claims target the parties responsible 
 
 130. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 79–197; Original Petition at 12–20, 
Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. June 30, 
2017) [hereinafter Oklahoma Complaint]; Verified Complaint at 80–203, County of Nassau 
v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 605477/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 2017), NYSCEF No. 2 
[hereinafter Nassau County Complaint]. 
 131. See, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra note 101, at 18–26; Illinois Complaint, 
supra note 101, at 11–28; Complaint at 19–42, City of Portsmouth v. AmerisourceBergen 
Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00723 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2017), ECF No. 1 [Portsmouth 
Complaint]. 
 132. See Complaint, County of Wayne v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2:17-CV-13334-JCO-
EAS (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2017), ECF No. 1. 
 133. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 79–197; Oklahoma Complaint, supra 
note 130, at 12–20; Nassau County Complaint, supra note 130, at 80–203. 
 134. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 14–29; Oklahoma Complaint, supra 
note 130, at 4–6; Nassau County Complaint, supra note 130, at 14–29. 
 135. Scruggs, supra note 112; see, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra note 101, at 18–
26; Illinois Complaint, supra note 101, at 11–28; Portsmouth Complaint, supra note 131, at 
19–42. 
 136. Scruggs, supra note 112. 
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for maintaining a closed distribution chain:  usually137 the “Big 3” opioid 
distributors.138 
Besides alleging that an inequitable act (either misrepresentation or 
diversion) caused direct injury to the plaintiff’s interests, the plaintiffs 
employ either a tort-based theory or equitable theory to complete the direct-
injury claim.  On the one hand, tort-based theories urge the court to award 
damages in favor of the plaintiff by establishing that the defendants had a 
duty of care toward the plaintiff and that they breached that duty of care 
through their wrongful conduct.  On the other hand, non-tort-based equitable 
theories overlook duties of care and “do not hinge on fault, but rather on who 
should pay when the public is damaged by the conduct of a legal business.”139  
For example, when the state of Illinois sued opioid distributors for diversion, 
they used four tort-based theories and one equitable theory.140  The tort 
theories established a duty of care based upon the following statutes:  the 
federal Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; 
Illinois’s Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act, which is very similar to the federal 
RICO statute; Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 
Act; and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (adopted by Illinois and 
other states across the country).141  The sole equitable theory was based upon 
the common-law concept of public nuisance.142  Richard Scruggs, a 
prominent lawyer during the tobacco litigation, argues that non-fault-based 
equity claims are strongest for government plaintiffs because they “enable 
the states to say ‘so what’ to the industry’s defensive claims that the FDA 
preemptively regulated opioids and that their addiction warning labels were 
ipso facto sufficient.”143  Other scholars argue that the objective legal 
strength of government-entity claims does not matter because their collective 
strength will drive defendants toward settlement.144  This Note suggests that 
the government is willing to make arguably dubious direct-injury claims 
because their other options are bleak. 
C.  The Challenges for Opioid Plaintiffs in Other Forms of Civil Litigation 
The first lawsuits against opioid companies were brought by addicted 
individuals or their families and were directed at Purdue Pharma, the 
company responsible for creating and marketing OxyContin.  By 2003, 
Purdue faced over 300 such lawsuits and had spent “tens of millions of 
 
 137. In some rare cases, cities make allegations of diversion solely against manufacturers. 
See Everett Complaint, supra note 101. 
 138. See supra note 91. 
 139. Scruggs, supra note 112. 
 140. Illinois Complaint, supra note 101, at 44–78. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 44–53. 
 143. Scruggs, supra note 112. 
 144. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco:  Is 
the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 
685, 687–90 (2000).  Rather than focus on the strength or specifics of particular liability 
theories, this Note focuses on the general role of direct-injury claims as they relate to other 
forms of civil litigation. 
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dollars in legal fees maintaining an aggressive no settlement stance.”145  The 
individual and class action lawsuits continued to grow in numbers over the 
next several years.  It is contested whether these lawsuits were “successful” 
or “failed” attempts146 because, while Purdue won most of the cases at the 
summary judgment stage,147 information gathered through these lawsuits 
was the driving factor behind the criminal prosecution of Purdue in 2007.148 
It is also difficult to gauge the success of the individual lawsuits because 
so many were settled before courts made any judgment on the substantive 
claims.  In 2006, two firms that represented around “5,000 claimants 
reportedly settled their cases . . . for a total of $75 million.”149  In 2007, 
Purdue made another series of big settlements:  two in July totaling $40 
million, a mass settlement of 1000 lawsuits in February for $75 million,150 
and many of the remaining 370 lawsuits during the criminal prosecution for 
$130 million.151  Regardless of whether these lawsuits are labeled as 
successes or failures, there are multiple obstacles that both individual and 
class action lawsuits will face in the future. 
1.  Blameworthy Victims in Opioid Litigation 
When individual addicts (or their families) sue large pharmaceutical 
companies, regardless of the type of liability theory they use, they are 
hindered by two features:  blameworthiness and an unequal balance of 
resources.  The blameworthiness of the plaintiff (or decedent) in individual 
lawsuits has allowed opioid defendants to assert the following defenses:  
product misuse,152 wrongful conduct,153 and contributory or comparative 
negligence.154  Individual victims simply cannot escape the fact that their 
blameworthy behavior has contributed to their own addiction and makes 
them less deserving of relief from opioid companies. 
a.  Product Misuse 
One form of blameworthy opioid-addict behavior is the misuse of 
prescription opioids, which involves a disregard for product labels or 
unorthodox methods of drug ingestion.  A product-manufacturer defendant 
may assert the product-misuse defense whenever an alleged injury to the 
plaintiff is the result of “abnormal handling, abnormal preparation for use, or 
 
 145. Frederickson, supra note 74, at 134. 
 146. See STEVEN GARBER, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS 27, 38 n.29 
(2013). 
 147. Ausness, supra note 66, at 1122. 
 148. See Joseph, supra note 76. 
 149. GARBER, supra note 146, at 38 n.29. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (W.D. Va. 2007). 
 152. See Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 153. See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 154. See infra notes 194–205 and accompanying text. 
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abnormal consumption of the product” at issue.155  The exact definition of 
product misuse has varied across jurisdictions, but the Model Uniform 
Product Liability Act states that misuse occurs whenever “the product user 
does not act in a manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably 
prudent person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar 
circumstances.”156 
Different courts have held that product misuse is synonymous with 
unintended, unforeseeable, unanticipated, or unexpected uses of a product.157  
Depending on the jurisdiction, misuse is interpreted either as a part of the 
defendant’s burden of proof (an affirmative defense) or a part of the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof (effectively negating an essential element of the 
plaintiff’s case).158  For example, in Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon,159 fourteen-
year-old Robert Saenz shot his friend James Sherk using a Daisy-Heddon BB 
gun.160  The families of Sherk and Saenz brought an action against the 
manufacturer, asserting that Daisy-Heddon failed to warn its consumers that 
their pump-up BB rifle was more powerful than others.161  The issue was that 
Saenz shot Sherk in the head from close range, despite his knowledge that 
BBs fired from close range “could kill animals and blind a person.”162  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the second interpretation of product 
misuse, found that Saenz’s misuse of the product negated the element of 
proximate cause, and dismissed the case.163 
For individual lawsuits against opioid companies, the second 
interpretation of product misuse is similarly detrimental to a plaintiff’s case.  
Labzda v. Purdue Pharma,164 a wrongful death claim brought by the family 
of an opioid addict who died of an overdose, illustrates this point.  Labzda’s 
family asserted that Purdue was aware of their son’s doctor overprescribing 
OxyContin but “did not attempt to curtail the inappropriate prescriptions,” 
which was “a breach of the duty of care in the marketing and distribution of 
the product.”165  The court dismissed the case because, on the night of his 
death, in addition to consuming two 80-milligram tablets of OxyContin, 
Labzda smoked marijuana, drank a substantial quantity of alcohol,166 “and 
took approximately three tablets of the strongest strength of Xanax.”167  
Moreover, he chose to crush and inhale his OxyContin pills rather than ingest 
 
 155. Annotation, Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R. 4th 263 § 2[a] (1988). 
 156. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,737 (Oct. 31, 1979). 
 157. Annotation, supra note 155, pt. VII. 
 158. Alfred W. Gans et al., Annotation, Misuse, Abuse or Abnormal Use of Product, 6 Am. 
L. Torts § 18:158 (2017). 
 159. 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982). 
 160. Id. at 618. 
 161. Id. at 616. 
 162. Id. at 618. 
 163. Id. at 618–20. 
 164. 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 165. Id. at 1349. 
 166. “Michael drank approximately 14 beers (eight of them after 1:00 a.m.), shared 
approximately five marijuana cigarettes, drank a shot of rum, drank at least two rum and 
Cokes . . . .” Id. at 1350. 
 167. Id. 
2018] LITIGATING THE OPIOID CRISIS 1163 
them orally as instructed.168  The case was dismissed at the summary 
judgment stage as the court found that the patient’s “intentional misuse of an 
intoxicating product [OxyContin] [wa]s the sole proximate cause of the 
injury.”169 
The court in Labzda made clear that, like the Pennsylvania court in Sherk, 
“Florida courts routinely apply the doctrine of sole proximate cause when the 
user intentionally misuses a product to his detriment.”170  Labzda had 
misused OxyContin despite being aware that crushing, snorting, and mixing 
alcohol with the pills was dangerous.171  Thus, Labzda had destroyed any 
chances for recovery because his misuse of the product was considered the 
sole cause of injury under the laws of the state.  The court argued that, like 
alcohol distributors, opioid manufacturers cannot be held liable for a 
plaintiff’s injuries if the plaintiff voluntarily misused their product.172 
b.  The Wrongful Conduct Rule 
Another obstacle for lawsuits by individuals arises whenever an individual 
plaintiff engages in unlawful or wrongful conduct.173  As a general rule, a 
plaintiff “cannot maintain an action if he or she must rely, in whole or in part, 
on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he or she is a party in 
order to establish a cause of action.”174  The “wrongful conduct” or “serious 
misconduct” rule is a way to completely bar a plaintiff’s claim and avoid 
even partial damages through comparative fault.175  This ancient doctrine 
derives from Lord Mansfield’s proclamation in Holman v. Johnson,176 “ex 
dolo malo non oritur actio,” meaning “no Court will lend its aid to a man 
who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.”177  The 
wrongful conduct rule has been resurrected in the U.S. common-law system 
under limited circumstances as a method to effectively “short-circuit” a 
plaintiff’s claim.178 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1356. 
 170. Id. 
 171. The package insert for OxyContin clearly stated, in bold letters, that “TABLETS ARE 
TO BE SWALLOWED WHOLE, AND ARE NOT TO BE BROKEN, CHEWED OR 
CRUSHED.  TAKING BROKEN CHEWED OR CRUSHED OxyContin TABLETS COULD 
LEAD TO THE RAPID RELEASE AND ABSORPTION OF A POTENTIALLY TOXIC 
DOSE OF OXYCODONE . . . .  AVOID ALCOHOL while you are using this medicine.” Id. 
at 1349–50. 
 172. “[F]oreseeable voluntary abuse of a non-defective product, such as alcohol, results in 
the legal conclusion that the proximate cause of the injury to the consumer was his voluntary 
abuse; the manufacturer of the substance is not liable for the injury to the user.” Id. at 1356. 
 173. See Lauren Rosseau & I. Eric Nordan, Tug v. Mingo:  Let the Plaintiffs Sue—Opioid 
Addiction, the Wrongful Conduct Rule, and the Culpability Exception, 34 T.M. COOLEY L. 
REV. 33, 52–60 (2017). 
 174. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 68 (2017). 
 175. Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines:  The Serious Misconduct Bar in 
Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2002). 
 176. (1775) 1 Cowper 341 (KB). 
 177. Id. at 343. 
 178. See King, supra note 175, at 1017. 
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One of those limited circumstances has involved personal injury claims by 
prescription medication addicts and their families.  In Orzel v. Scott Drug 
Co.,179 a “drug user’s claim against [a] pharmacy for allegedly negligently 
and illegally filling [the] drug user’s purportedly valid prescriptions was 
barred since it was based, at least in part, on [the] drug user’s illegal 
conduct.”180  The court in Orzel explained the rationale behind the wrongful 
conduct rule:  (1) if courts made relief available for wrongdoers, they would 
be condoning illegal conduct; (2) courts must foreclose any possibility of 
wrongdoers profiting from or being compensated for their illegal acts; and 
(3) “related to the two previously mentioned results, the public would 
[otherwise] view the legal system as a mockery of justice.”181 
Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.182 is another illustration of the wrongful 
conduct rule and involves the specific issue of opioid addiction rather than 
drug addiction in general.183  In Foister, seven plaintiffs sued Purdue for 
failing to properly warn its consumers of OxyContin’s addictiveness.184  All 
but one plaintiff illegally altered his or her prescription pills before ingesting 
them.185  In order to satisfy their opioid cravings, some plaintiffs would crush 
their pills and snort them, and some intravenously injected up to eight pills a 
day.186  The court held that the plaintiffs’ illegal alteration of the pills 
constituted wrongful conduct and was the proximate cause of their 
injuries.187  The court justified its decision by citing the public policy 
concerns from Orzel.188 
Other cases have reached similar results to Foister and involved much 
more sympathetic plaintiffs.  In Price v. Purdue Pharma Co.,189 the 
plaintiff’s opioid addiction began when doctors prescribed him OxyContin 
to treat “his sickle cell anemia and related pain.”190  There was no evidence 
of illegal alteration of prescription pills, but there was evidence of doctor-
 
 179. 537 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1995). 
 180. Id. at 208. 
 181. Id. at 213. 
 182. 295 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 183. See id. at 693–709. 
 184. Id. at 696–701.  It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs in this case were far from 
sympathetic; one of them “had an extensive criminal history which included malicious 
wounding of a police officer, assault, criminal mischief, terroristic threatening, conspiracy to 
possess, sale [sic] and deliver cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, unlawful taking, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, criminal 
trespassing” and many other convictions. Id. at 700–01. 
 185. See id. at 703. 
 186. One plaintiff had a particularly complicated method for abusing prescription pills. Id. 
at 697.  In his own words, he would 
lick the coating off of [the OxyContin], bust them off, buy a bottle of water and pour 
it in a cap, and . . . just draw up seven units of water and throw on it, take it back to 
the rig and work it up, and take a piece of cotton off the filter and put it on the needle 
and filter it, draw it up and hit it. 
Id. 
 187. Id. at 704. 
 188. Id. 
 189. 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006). 
 190. Id. at 482. 
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shopping191 to satisfy his opioid cravings; Price traveled to three different 
cities, visited seven different pharmacies, attended ten different clinics, and 
consulted with ten different physicians to obtain as many prescription 
medications as possible.192  Although much more sympathetic than the 
plaintiffs in Foister, Price had similarly engaged in illegal conduct to further 
his opioid addiction.  Invoking Lord Mansfield’s maxim from Holman v. 
Johnson, the Mississippi court barred the plaintiff’s claim entirely.193 
c.  Contributory and Comparative Negligence 
Even if a wrongful-conduct or product-misuse defense by opioid 
companies is rejected, there remains a potential obstacle for opioid addicts 
and their families when suing opioid manufacturers and distributors:  
contributory or comparative negligence.  Although opioid lawsuits have not 
reached the question of contributory negligence because none have reached 
the jury-deliberation stage, it is highly likely that this issue will arise in future 
lawsuits and thus influence the likelihood of a successful settlement.  The 
Second Restatement of Torts describes contributory and comparative 
negligence as “conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the 
standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a 
legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant 
in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”194  An opioid addict’s decision to 
misuse drugs or ignore warning labels, for example, is likely to fit within the 
definition of contributory or comparative negligence.  Contingent upon the 
law a state follows and the plaintiff’s level of negligence, an opioid addict’s 
negligent conduct may either bar her claim entirely or reduce the amount of 
damages she receives.195 
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia all follow a strict contributory negligence regime that makes it 
likely that an opioid addict’s negligent behavior will completely bar her 
claim.196  In those five jurisdictions, “a plaintiff’s recovery is completely 
barred when the plaintiff’s negligence contributes in any degree to the cause 
of the injury.”197  Thus, if the plaintiffs in Foister or Price brought their 
action in an Alabama court, they would almost certainly be barred from 
recovery under the contributory negligence rule because their improper 
conduct in obtaining or ingesting prescription pills fell below the standard of 
 
 191. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 192. Price, 920 So. 2d at 482. 
 193. Id. at 484–86. 
 194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1966). 
 195. See 9 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY:  ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 43.22 (2017). 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. (emphasis added). 
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a reasonable person and contributed to some degree to their opioid 
addiction.198 
The majority of states, however, have abandoned the contributory 
negligence doctrine.  Most states instead follow a “modified comparative 
negligence” regime that will only bar a plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff’s 
negligence was more than 50 percent responsible for the alleged injury.199  
The rest of the jurisdictions in America follow a “pure comparative 
negligence” regime, “allow[ing] a contributorily negligent plaintiff to 
recover damages . . . even when the plaintiff is 99 percent culpable.”200  
However, even in the pure comparative negligence jurisdictions, when the 
plaintiff’s negligence is 100 percent responsible or “the sole proximate cause 
of the loss or injury,” the plaintiff’s claim will be barred.201  For example, in 
Horton v. American Tobacco Co.,202 a decedent’s family sued a cigarette 
manufacturer under a negligence and strict liability theory.203  The jury 
“returned a verdict . . . in favor of the plaintiffs but awarded zero damages” 
because it found his decision to continue smoking despite warnings of health 
dangers 100 percent responsible or the sole proximate cause of his cancer.204 
Thus, if an opioid addict’s negligent conduct in obtaining or ingesting 
prescription pills is found to be more than 50 percent responsible for their 
addiction and the subsequent harm, the plaintiff’s claim will be completely 
barred in the states that follow a modified comparative negligence or 
contributory negligence regime.  In the other jurisdictions, the plaintiff’s 
claim will be completely barred if the jury finds they are 100 percent 
responsible for their addiction and the subsequent harm.  It is yet to be seen 
whether opioid addicts will reach the 50 percent or 100 percent threshold,205 
but it is likely that jurors will bar their claims as they have for tobacco 
smokers. 
2.  Why Aggregate Actions Are Useful for Opioid Victims 
Another possible issue for individual victims (or even small groups of 
victims) concerns unequal resource allocation and a negative value of return 
for plaintiffs.  A negative-value claim arises whenever the cost of a lawsuit 
 
 198. The court in Foister repeatedly emphasizes the illegality of the plaintiff’s conduct and 
notes that their addictions were “dilemma[s] which they [themselves] created.” Foister v. 
Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 199. Ten states follow a “not as great as” modified comparative negligence regime and 
require that the negligence of a defendant exceed 50 percent for the plaintiff to recover. See 9 
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 195, § 43.22.  Twenty-one states adhere to a “not greater 
than” modified comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s claim will be barred if their 
negligence was more than 50 percent responsible for the alleged injury. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995). 
 203. See id. at 1290. 
 204. Id. at 1291–92. 
 205. The author’s research for this Note could not identify a single opioid claim that 
reached jury verdict.  The question of contributory and comparative negligence as applied to 
opioid claims remains to be addressed. 
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exceeds the amount at stake, thus disincentivizing a single individual from 
bringing forth the claim.206  Many opioid addicts have such negative-value 
claims.  Purdue Pharma, along with other pharmaceutical companies, is 
known to take an aggressive stance toward litigation and resolutely defends 
against every possible claim.207  This makes the cost of pursuing litigation 
very high for plaintiffs, and even if the asserted damages are high, an 
uncertainty of success208 will convert it into a negative-value claim.  Most 
victims will resort to contingency fee agreements, and plaintiffs’ lawyers find 
it preferable for addicts to pool resources and split the risks of litigation 
through aggregation.  There are two types of aggregate lawsuits that could 
achieve that goal:  joinder actions and representative actions. 
The joinder action is a permissive method to combine multiple plaintiffs 
or defendants in the interest of convenience and to avoid “duplicate 
presentation of evidence relating to facts common to more than one demand 
for relief.”209  Joinder is beneficial because it allows for the efficient 
resolution of similar claims and only binds parties to the suit.  The downside 
is that courts rarely allow massive joinder and are particularly adverse to 
massive joinder arising from the use of the same pharmaceutical product.210  
Injured parties who hope to aggregate identical claims of injury from the 
same pharmaceutical product are forced to turn to representative actions. 
The most popular form of representative action is the class action, but other 
examples include parens patriae actions and qui tam litigation.  Class actions 
allow thousands of injured persons to “achieve economies of time and 
effort.”211  The ability to aggregate claims and resources with other addicts 
is key to redressing their harms.  Unfortunately, class actions have “fallen 
into disfavor as a means of resolving mass tort claims arising from personal 
injuries.”212  There are problems with the other forms of representative 
actions as well. 
3.  Aggregation Challenges in Opioid Litigation 
Although representative actions are extremely beneficial to opioid addict 
plaintiffs, each form of representative action faces major difficulties when 
applied to prescription-opioid mass tort liability.  Parens patriae actions are 
 
 206. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . 
may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually.”). 
 207. Purdue did not enter into a single settlement related to opioid addiction until it had 
spent “an estimated $250 million in sustained defensive efforts.” Frederickson, supra note 74, 
at 134. 
 208. See infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 209. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1652 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 210. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(A) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
 211. Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 212. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporter’s note cmt. 
b(1)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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inapplicable in the context of mass tort product liability, qui tam litigation213 
has been wholly ineffective against opioid defendants, and class actions face 
great difficulty obtaining class certification.  Moreover, when analyzed as a 
whole, all three types of representative action can potentially produce 
inequitable results by binding nonparties to judgments. 
a.  Parens Patriae Actions Are Inapplicable 
to Mass Tort Product Liability 
The Supreme Court has never granted parens patriae standing for a mass 
tort product liability claim.  It is unlikely to do so in the future despite both 
the steady expansion of America’s parens patriae doctrine and opioid 
companies’ failure to challenge the doctrine.214  In every Supreme Court 
case215 where state governments have asserted parens patriae standing, “the 
harms suffered by the original (individual) victims were causally connected 
to their residency within a particular state . . . and not another 
jurisdiction.”216  By contrast, in the context of mass tort product liability 
actions, “the state of residence and the harm sustained are independent 
variables.”217  Unlike the typical parens patriae claim where the injury 
asserted is unique to residence within a particular state, a mass tort product 
liability claim against opioid manufacturers has no relation to one’s state of 
residence because the opioid epidemic is ravaging the entire nation and not 
just a single state.218 
Moreover, mass product liability cases are unlikely to fit within the one 
exception to the general rule:  Massachusetts v. EPA.  In that case, the state 
of Massachusetts (along with local governments and environmental 
organizations) sought to review the denial of a rulemaking petition by the 
 
 213. See infra Part II.C.3.b. 
 214. Parens patriae standing was contested in the course of the tobacco litigation, but the 
court never addressed it and focused on other grounds for finding that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing. See City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1142 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims for lack of standing because the harms asserted by San 
Francisco were too far removed from a tobacco manufacturer’s misconduct); City of Chicago 
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (dismissing the claims of 
the City of Chicago for lack of standing due to failure to demonstrate causation). 
 215. There is one exception:  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See infra notes 
219–24 and accompanying text. 
 216. DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:  
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 126 (2010); see also, e.g., Alfred 
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (addressing 
parens patriae in the context of a farmer’s decree that affected only Puerto Rican workers); 
Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 443–44 (1945) (determining that a railroad company’s 
price-fixing adversely affected Georgia citizens); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 
(1901) (involving efforts by Missouri to stop the construction of a canal that would funnel 
1500 tons of Chicago’s trash to Missouri); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1900) 
(involving Texas’s embargo on all goods from New Orleans to stop the spread of yellow 
fever). 
 217. GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 126. 
 218. See supra Introduction. 
2018] LITIGATING THE OPIOID CRISIS 1169 
EPA that would have regulated motor vehicle emissions.219  The Court 
determined that Massachusetts had parens patriae standing despite the fact 
that greenhouse gases affect everyone throughout the country (and 
throughout the world) because the state lost its power to regulate 
environmental threats when the federal government transferred that authority 
to the EPA.220  This exception adheres to the general purpose of parens 
patriae claims:  a method for states “to protect the general welfare—where 
they ha[ve] no other constitutional means of doing so.”221 
Mass tort claims do not fit within the Massachusetts v. EPA exception nor 
do they align with the general rationale behind parens patriae standing.  
Although one could argue that the opioid epidemic qualifies as an 
“environmental harm”222 similar to the greenhouse gases at issue in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, there are differences between the two cases that 
preclude parens patriae standing.  First off, in the opioid litigation, the states 
are not suing the entities to whom they transferred regulatory powers (the 
FDA or the DEA) for their inability to properly monitor the opioid industry; 
they are suing the manufacturers directly.  Secondly, government entities 
have plenty of other constitutional means available to them to address opioid 
addiction, and indeed they have pursued those other means.223  Civil 
litigation is merely another method for the states to recover lost funds. 
b.  Qui Tam Litigation:  Rare and Ineffective 
Qui tam litigation is another form of representative action that is difficult 
to initiate because it requires the assistance of a “whistleblower.”  
Furthermore, in the one instance it has been used against opioid companies 
it was wholly ineffectual.  In 1863, the government passed the False Claims 
Act, which gave rise to what are known as “qui tam” lawsuits, where a private 
party (usually a “whistleblower” exposing illegal activity from within a 
corporation) sues on behalf of themselves and the government.224  Qui tam 
lawsuits became very popular225 once the False Claims Act was amended to 
increase recovery amounts so relators could recover up to 30 percent of the 
proceeds and full recovery of their attorney’s fees.226  Qui tam lawsuits have 
been a particularly useful tool against drug companies; according to the 
Assistant Attorney General, whistleblowers sued “over 200 drug 
manufacturers” in 2004.227 
 
 219. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
 220. See GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 126–27. 
 221. Thomas, supra note 118, at 791. 
 222. See GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 127. 
 223. See supra Part I. 
 224. Frederickson, supra note 74, at 123. 
 225. There were over four hundred qui tam lawsuits in 2004. Edward P. Lansdale, Note, 
Used as Directed?:  How Prosecutors Are Expanding the False Claims Act to Police 
Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 176 (2006). 
 226. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 227. Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006:  Cutting Edge and 
Regulatory Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 109 (2006). 
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Although qui tam lawsuits have led to many victories for the U.S. 
government against drug companies in general,228 these lawsuits have been 
quite unsuccessful against opioid companies specifically.  For one, qui tam 
lawsuits require the assistance of a “whistleblower,” someone willing to 
release secrets about their employer and initiate lengthy litigation.  Mark 
Radcliffe is the only “whistleblower” to have fought the opioid industry; he 
targeted Purdue Pharma and failed repeatedly.229  At first, Radcliffe sued on 
behalf of himself and the U.S. government, alleging that his former employer, 
Purdue Pharma, had “misrepresented to physicians the relative potency of 
Purdue’s pain medication, OxyContin, which resulted in federal and state 
agencies, such as Medicaid, paying more than was necessary in 
reimbursement.”230  At the district court level, his complaint was dismissed 
because it failed to reach the high pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.231  At the appellate level, the court 
dismissed his complaint on separate grounds:  Radcliffe had apparently 
signed a release when leaving Purdue that “in exchange for a considerable 
sum of money and other benefits” discharged Purdue of “all liability.”232  
About two years after Radcliffe’s claims were dismissed, his wife resurrected 
his claims and initiated her own qui tam litigation with almost identical 
claims to her husband’s.233  She failed at both the district234 and appellate 
level, just like her husband.235 
c.  The Difficulty of Class Certification in Opioid Litigation 
Class actions, although more successful than qui tam lawsuits, face major 
difficulties during the certification stage.  To be certified as a class action, 
the prospective class must meet the requirements set forth in Rule 23.236  
First, the plaintiff must satisfy all four of Rule 23(a)’s requirements:  
(1) numerosity of class members, (2) commonality of legal or factual 
questions, (3) typicality of claims and defenses of the class representative, 
and (4) adequacy of class representation.237  In addition to meeting the Rule 
 
 228. See Erika Kelton, Revival of Gilead Whistleblower’s Lawsuit Should Stoke Fear in 
Big Pharma, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/ 
2017/09/26/revival-of-gilead-whistleblowers-lawsuit-should-stoke-fear-in-big-pharma 
[https://perma.cc/4CAD-8D9E] (discussing successful qui tam lawsuits by the U.S. 
government against Big Pharma companies). 
 229. See United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 5:10-CV-01423, 2012 WL 
4056720 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 14, 2012), vacated and remanded, 737 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2013); 
United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 582 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Va. 2008), 
rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 230. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:05CV00089, 2009 WL 
161003, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan 25, 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 231. Id.  Rule 9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 232. United States ex rel. Radcliffe, 600 F.3d at 326. 
 233. United States ex rel. May, 2012 WL 4056720, at *1. 
 234. Id. at *8. 
 235. United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 811 F.3d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 236. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 237. Id. r. 23(a). 
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23(a) prerequisites, the plaintiff must fit into one of the categories set forth 
in Rule 23(b).238  Many courts dismiss class actions against opioid companies 
for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a) and thus do not discuss Rule 23(b).239 
For example, in Campbell v. Purdue Pharma,240 two plaintiffs hoped to 
represent a class of Missouri residents who suffered harm as a result of being 
“prescribed and consum[ing] OxyContin for the treatment of any condition 
other than moderate to severe pain caused by terminal illness or moderate to 
severe pain caused by non-chronic condition.”241  For the 23(a)(1) 
numerosity requirement, the plaintiff was required to establish a “reasonable 
estimate” of the number of prospective class members.242  The plaintiff’s 
estimate that there would be “thousands of persons in the Class” was 
considered unreasonable.243  Alternatively, the plaintiffs tried to prove 
numerosity by using the national sales data of OxyContin, noting that “in 
2002, there were approximately 6.2 million OxyContin[] prescriptions for 
noncancer pain.”244  In this particular case, the court accepted national sales 
data as sufficient evidence to establish numerosity.245  But in another case, 
Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma,246 the court held that information of “sales 
volume alone will not justify a finding of numerosity.”247 
Gevedon is an interesting case because it also shows how difficult it is for 
opioid class actions to satisfy the 23(a)(2) requirement for commonality.  The 
plaintiffs in Gevedon sought to certify a class of Kentucky residents “who 
have obtained OxyContin and/or who obtain OxyC[o]ntin in the future” in 
order to bring a product liability action against Purdue Pharma.248  Judge 
Danny Reeves denied class certification because determinations of liability 
were reliant upon individualized questions of fact.249  Judge Reeves had ruled 
the same way in the earlier case of Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. when 
plaintiffs sought to certify a broader class of “all persons who have been 
harmed due to the addictive nature of OxyContin.”250  The court held that 
cause-in-fact determinations were highly specialized and that individual 
inquiries were required to determine whether “dosage, use and manner of 
administration of the drug, individual and family medical and psychological 
histories, [or] level of personal awareness regarding the purported risks and 
medical reasons for use” were the actual causes of injury.251  In the Southern 
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District of Ohio and in the Eastern District of Missouri, when dealing with 
fact patterns similar to Foister, courts have denied certification on similar 
grounds.252 
Even the 23(a)(3) typicality requirement has created difficulties for class 
certification.  The Missouri court in Campbell explained that, to pass 
typicality, the named plaintiff must “have the same essential characteristics 
as the claims of the class at large and is designed to prevent an instance where 
the legal theories of the named plaintiff may potentially conflict with those 
of absent plaintiffs.”253  There were two named plaintiffs in Campbell, David 
and Belinda Campbell, who each took varied doses of OxyContin254 and 
simultaneously ingested OxyContin with other drugs such as Xanax, Vioxx, 
and Zoloft.255  Both of these factors would influence a finding of causation 
and open a range of conduct-based defenses that may conflict with the 
theories of the general class.256  These essential factors “preclude[d] a finding 
that their claims are typical of the class.”257  It is very difficult to create a 
class of opioid defendants large enough to fulfill numerosity and similar 
enough to pass typicality and commonality.  Moreover, even if a class of 
addicts or consumers is somehow certified, class actions are problematic 
because they foreclose the possibility of future lawsuits. 
d.  Potential to Bind Nonparties to Judgment 
In addition to their individualized problems, all traditional representative 
actions have the potential to bind nonparties to the judgment, which produces 
potentially inequitable results for future plaintiffs.  All the traditional 
representative actions (class action, qui tam, parens patriae) are 
distinguished from other forms of aggregate lawsuits in that they have the 
potential to bind nonparties.258  It is intuitive that a class action would bind 
nonparties because the named plaintiff is acting as a representative for 
similarly situated parties.  In the case of parens patriae lawsuits, however, it 
is harder to imagine why the government has the ability to bind nonparties 
when it is representing the general welfare rather than a particular group of 
injured citizens.259  Nevertheless, courts find that nonparties are bound to the 
judgment entered against a parens patriae representative just as they would 
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be for a class action representative.260  If a class action or parens patriae 
representative sues an opioid company, they may be foreclosing all future 
actions against those parties.  Direct-injury claims would be preferable to 
other forms of civil litigation if they can function as representative actions 
without foreclosing future litigation by residents and citizens. 
III.  DIRECT-INJURY GOVERNMENT CLAIMS AS A SOLUTION TO THE 
CHALLENGES OF OPIOID CIVIL LITIGATION 
Direct-injury government-entity claims circumvent the obstacles that have 
hindered other forms of litigation against opioid companies.  First of all, 
government plaintiffs foreclose conduct-based defenses previously available 
to opioid defendants261 because the local governments are blameless in the 
context of the opioid epidemic.  Second, unlike parens patriae actions,262 
direct-injury government-entity claims are definitively applicable in the 
context of mass tort product liability.  In addition, direct-injury government-
entity claims are inherently representative actions, allowing for the 
aggregation of interests without any certification requirement and with no 
potential to bind nonparties.263  Direct-injury government-entity claims also 
allow for administrative and informal aggregation.  Informal aggregation is 
particularly important in the context of mass tort liability because it 
incentivizes pharmaceutical defendants to settle early. 
A.  Circumventing Conduct-Based Defenses 
Opioid addict plaintiffs and decedents are blameworthy individuals who 
arguably facilitated their own addictions despite being aware of the 
dangers.264  Their illegal conduct, product misuse, or contributory negligence 
allows opioid companies to introduce conduct-based defenses that have the 
potential to entirely bar the plaintiffs’ claims or diminish damage awards.265  
In contrast to opioid addicts, government entities have not contributed to the 
opioid epidemic and actually ameliorate opioid addiction through both 
proactive and reactive measures.266  Thus, direct-injury government-entity 
 
 260. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 340 (1958) (finding 
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 261. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 262. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 263. This is in contrast to traditional representative actions, which have burdensome class 
certification requirements and have the potential to foreclose future litigation by similarly 
situated plaintiffs. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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 266. See supra Part I. 
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claims circumvent all of the issues related to blameworthiness that 
encumbered lawsuits by individuals against opioid companies:  product 
misuse, wrongful conduct, and contributory or comparative negligence.267  
Opioid company defendants would, in most cases, fail to establish any of 
these conduct-based defenses against a government plaintiff. 
For one, opioid manufacturers and distributors are not provided with the 
requisite behavioral evidence if a government plaintiff, rather than individual 
addict, brings a claim.  Whenever an opioid addict or a group of opioid 
addicts sues an opioid company, they are required to prove causation based 
on each opioid user’s ingestion habits.268  This requirement reveals 
blameworthy conduct by the plaintiffs and grants the opioid company 
defendant the necessary evidence to establish a conduct-based defense.269  
Unlike individual lawsuits, government-entity lawsuits rely upon general 
statistical data to establish causation and include no information regarding 
the conduct of particular addicts within their sovereignty.270  The defendant 
manufacturer or distributor would have to research behavioral patterns for a 
huge population of addicts to prove that each addict was improperly ingesting 
prescription pills.  This burden makes it practically impossible for opioid 
companies to assert any conduct-based defenses such as wrongful conduct, 
product misuse, or contributory or comparative negligence.  Furthermore, 
even assuming that opioid defendants somehow find proof of widespread 
misuse or wrongful conduct, it is still unlikely the defenses will hold up in 
court. 
1.  Product Misuse 
Even if the pharmaceutical companies find evidence of rampant 
prescription pill abuse, government plaintiffs can rebut assertions of product 
misuse.  The product-misuse defense requires the moving party to establish 
“unintended, unforeseeable, unanticipated, or unexpected” consumption of 
the product that deviates from the conduct “of an ordinary reasonably prudent 
person.”271  This burden of proof places opioid defendants in a lose-lose 
scenario:  On the one hand, if an opioid company admits that most addicts 
responsible for depleting the state budget were using prescription pills as they 
were intended, then they cannot assert the unintended-use defense.  On the 
other hand, if the opioid companies assert that a majority of addicts 
responsible for depleting the state coffer were misusing their prescription 
 
 267. See supra Part II.C.1.a. 
 268. See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702–04 (E.D. Ky. 2003); 
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opioids (either by snorting, crushing, or injecting pills despite warning labels 
or by combining those pills with other dangerous substances),272 then it cuts 
against the argument that crushing, snorting, injecting, and mixing pills is 
truly an unintended purpose.  If opioid companies are aware that a majority 
of users are crushing, snorting, injecting, and mixing prescription drugs, then 
that is arguably an intended, foreseeable, anticipated, or expected use of the 
product.  Stated otherwise, if so many consumers are ignoring opioid 
warnings, then perhaps even the “reasonably prudent” person craves more 
powerful or immediate releases of opioids after experiencing withdrawal 
symptoms.273  Opioid manufacturers face a Catch-22 because the product-
misuse defense depends upon a showing of unforeseen circumstances and 
unreasonable behavior; but the companies cannot prove product misuse 
without conceding that the allegedly unintended actions were in fact 
foreseeable, clearly not “unexpected,” and perhaps even “reasonable.” 
2.  Wrongful Conduct 
Government entities are also in a unique position to foreclose the 
possibility of a wrongful or illegal conduct defense.  The wrongful conduct 
defense is only applicable where the plaintiff is the party to misuse the 
product at issue.274  Regardless of whether opioid addicts within a 
government’s sovereignty illegally altered pills275 or illegally obtained 
prescriptions,276 the government itself did not engage in such wrongful 
conduct.  Thus, the wrongful conduct defense will be unsuccessful against a 
city, county, or state.  This makes sense because the rationale from Orzel,277 
which courts refer to when invoking the wrongful conduct bar to a plaintiff’s 
claim,278 only applies when the plaintiff is a criminal or tortious actor.  In 
fact, government entities actually punish the illegal alteration or purchase of 
prescription pills,279 so there is no worry that courts are “in effect . . . 
condon[ing] and encourag[ing] illegal conduct.”280  Furthermore, the 
possibility that wrongdoers will be unjustly enriched by the court’s decision 
is very low.281  There is an arguably higher likelihood that a plaintiff’s verdict 
will go toward increased police enforcement and other infrastructure 
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improvements designed to stop wrongdoers from “receiv[ing] a profit or 
compensation as a result of their illegal acts.”282 
3.  Contributory and Comparative Negligence 
Government entities’ blameless qualities even foreclose opioid 
companies’ best defense:  contributory or comparative negligence.  Similar 
to the medical-cost-reimbursement lawsuits against tobacco companies in the 
1990s, perhaps the greatest advantage of direct-injury government-entity 
lawsuits is their ability to circumvent this defense.  In 1994, Mississippi 
Attorney General Mike Moore filed a lawsuit against tobacco companies 
seeking to recover Medicaid costs expended by Mississippi as a result of 
smoking-related illnesses.283  Fourteen other states followed suit and alleged 
that they were entitled to recover their share of medical costs that resulted 
from tobacco companies’ tortious conduct.284  That litigation bears striking 
similarities to the ongoing opioid lawsuits:  both seek to recover medical 
costs expended upon the treatment of addictive products and both share 
similar causes of action (fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, violation 
of consumer protection statutes, civil RICO claims, and equity-based claims 
such as restitution and public nuisance).285  Most pertinent to the issue of 
contributory negligence is the fact that both sets of litigation “are not brought 
on behalf of the injured smokers [or opioid addicts].  Instead they are brought 
on behalf of the states themselves to recover the medical costs they have been 
forced to pay to care for indigent smokers [or opioid addicts].”286 
The scholars Phillip Patterson and Jennifer Philpott explained the genius 
behind the state tobacco litigation as “effectively forestall[ing]” one of the 
tobacco industry’s best defenses:  contributory negligence.287  The defense 
of contributory negligence was no longer available to tobacco companies 
because “the tobacco industry could not plausibly argue that the states . . . 
contributed to the financial harm caused to them.”288  Similarly, opioid 
manufacturers and distributors cannot plausibly argue that government 
entities contributed to the financial harm caused by the opioid epidemic.  
Thus, the contributory or comparative negligence defense for opioid 
companies is essentially foreclosed when the government is the plaintiff. 
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B.  An Effective Substitute for Parens Patriae Claims 
In addition to avoiding the challenges that impeded individual lawsuits, 
direct-injury government claims are an effective substitute for parens patriae 
actions because they are definitively applicable in the context of mass tort 
product liability.  Moreover, they can be asserted by cities and counties as 
the sole basis for standing whereas parens patriae claims cannot.289 
The Supreme Court has never found parens patriae standing in a mass tort 
product liability action, and it is unlikely that it will.290  Parens patriae is a 
legitimate basis for standing when government entities have “no other 
constitutional means” of protecting the general welfare.291  In order for 
parens patriae to apply, “the harms suffered by the original (individual) 
victims [must be] causally connected to their residency within a particular 
states.”292  The sole exception to this general rule, the only circumstance in 
which the Supreme Court has found parens patriae standing despite the harm 
suffered being independent of residence within a particular state, is when one 
government entity sues another government entity to which they have 
transferred sovereign power.293  Mass tort claims by government entities do 
not fit the parens patriae doctrine because:  (1) government entities have 
plenty of other constitutional means to address the opioid epidemic besides 
civil litigation;294 (2) the opioid epidemic has affected the entire nation and 
involves an injury disconnected from residence within a particular state;295 
and (3) government entities are suing opioid companies, not federal agencies 
to whom they have transferred regulatory powers.296 
Direct-injury lawsuits, unlike parens patriae lawsuits, can be brought even 
when the plaintiff’s alleged injury is disconnected from residence within a 
particular state or when there are plenty of other constitutional means of 
addressing a particular problem.  Government entities can assert direct-injury 
claims like any other litigant so long as there is injury to a sovereign or 
proprietary interest of the state.297  The loss of tax revenue, for example, 
qualifies as a direct injury to the state’s proprietary interests.298  There is 
definitive national data on productivity lost due to opioid addiction that states 
may utilize to prove lost tax revenue.299  So long as states are careful to 
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provide specific evidence of lost revenue rather than mere speculation, 
government plaintiffs will successfully establish standing.300 
C.  Direct-Injury Government Claims Are Inherently 
Representative Litigation 
Direct-injury government-entity claims are especially fascinating because 
they inherently function as representative actions, allowing for the 
aggregation of interests without any certification requirement and with no 
potential to bind nonparties.  Aggregation is particularly important in the 
context of the opioid litigation because the costs of litigation may outweigh 
the projected benefits.301  Pharmaceutical giants like Purdue Pharma are 
known to take an aggressive no-settlement stance toward litigation,302 and 
the probability of success is uncertain.303  For these reasons, the ability to 
pool resources and split the risks of litigation is especially important.  
Unfortunately, courts are unwilling to allow massive joinder involving the 
same pharmaceutical product304 and traditional representative actions such 
as class actions have great difficulty satisfying Rule 23(a).305  Direct-injury 
claims have the ability to effectively aggregate citizen interests while 
bypassing the obstacles that hindered representative actions. 
Furthermore, direct-injury government-entity lawsuits are not subject to 
traditional aggregation requirements because they do not fit the mold of mass 
joinder or representative actions.  A direct-injury claim is not a joinder action 
because it does not necessarily join the claims of multiple plaintiffs into one 
proceeding; it often involves just one plaintiff (a city, municipality, or 
state).306  Furthermore, it is not a representative action because the 
government is suing on behalf of itself, not on behalf of citizens or 
consumers.307 
Although direct-injury government-entity claims are not aggregate actions 
in the formal sense, they are inherently representative actions because the 
government functions as an inherent representative of nonparties to the suit.  
When a state sues on behalf of itself it is disguising the fact that government 
entities always represent the interests of their constituents.  This concept of 
inherent representation is best understood through analogy.  Imagine a 
company suing a third party for injuries that the company itself (not its 
stakeholders) sustained.  On paper, the company is acting only as a 
representative of itself.  In reality, however, the company is acting as an 
inherent representative of its stakeholders because any injury to the 
company’s interest necessarily hurts its employees, creditors, and other 
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constituents (in the form of lower salaries, fewer benefits, and higher risk of 
debt default).  Likewise, any verdict in favor of the company will trickle 
down to its stakeholders either in the form of higher salaries, increased 
benefits, and so on. 
A direct-injury claim by a government entity is similar to a direct-injury 
claim by a company.  When the government incurs higher infrastructure costs 
due to opioid addiction, its citizens end up bearing those costs through higher 
taxes or reduced benefits.308  Similarly, when the government wins a verdict 
against a third party (e.g., a tortious opioid manufacturer or distributor), the 
citizens receive the fruits of the verdict through added benefits or lower 
taxes.309  Although the court views a government entity’s direct-injury claim 
as being solely representative of its own interests, in reality, the government 
is acting as a representative for all of its citizens.  This allows its citizens to 
aggregate their resources (tax money) toward a collective litigation effort 
lead by their attorney general. 
Although direct-injury claims are inherently representative and reap the 
benefits of aggregation, it is unlikely that courts will subject them to the 
formal requirements of representative actions.  Direct-injury claims will not 
face Rule 23 class action certification and will not bind nonparties to the 
judgment because courts are respectful of the form in which government-
entity claims are brought; in general, the court is unwilling to look past the 
stated parties in a complaint.310  In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky,311 
Purdue tried to remove a parens patriae action to federal court by arguing 
that the state attorney general was acting as a class action representative.  
Purdue “urged [the court] to look past the pleadings, the named parties, and 
the stated causes of action to deduce the true nature of this proceeding.”312  
Purdue highlighted how the “real part[y] in interest” was not the county or 
the state “but individual consumers for whom the Attorney General is acting, 
in effect, as a disguised class representative.”313  Despite Purdue’s 
description of the claim, the court stuck to the form of the pleadings and 
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refused to view the parens patriae claim as a disguised class action.314  The 
Supreme Court in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.315 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s view and made evident that courts are 
unwilling to look past the pleadings and will ignore real parties in interest.316  
There, the Court held that a parens patriae action against an LCD 
manufacturer did not constitute a “mass action” under the Class Action 
Fairness Act, despite the fact that “100 or more unnamed persons . . . [we]re 
real parties in interest as beneficiaries to any of the plaintiffs’ claims.”317  The 
Court’s unwillingness to classify government-entity claims as mass actions 
proves that it is unlikely to classify direct-injury claims (a subset of 
government-entity claims) as aggregate actions.  Although courts will not 
view a single direct-injury government-entity cause of action as a formal 
aggregation in itself, a series of direct-injury claims may be formally 
aggregated through administrative aggregation. 
D.  Judicial Intervention—Administrative Aggregation 
A group of direct-injury government-entity claims may be aggregated 
through administrative means just like any other form of litigation.  
Administrative aggregation “enable[s] judges to coordinate separate lawsuits 
for efficient processing.”318  Unlike representative actions, which may be 
initiated as a single action, administrative aggregation begins with separate 
trials that are later consolidated by judges.319  Separate trials are consolidated 
either as authorized by special procedural rules through formal 
administrative aggregation or “outside the ambit of specific rules or statutes” 
through informal administrative aggregation.320  One type of formal 
administrative aggregation is federal multidistrict consolidation,321 which 
allows a judicial panel of seven judges to aggregate claims with common 
facts in the interest of convenience, efficiency, and fairness.322 
On September 25, 2017, a private attorney involved in the opioid litigation 
moved to consolidate over sixty government-entity lawsuits from across the 
country through multidistrict litigation.323  As the number of lawsuits filed 
by government entities grew in numbers, so did the case list for Multidistrict 
Litigation Request Number 2804 (“MDL 2804”).  On December 5, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) ordered consolidation of 
more than one hundred lawsuits listed under MDL 2804, to be heard by Judge 
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Dan Polster.324  Although some government-entity lawsuits were excluded 
from the consolidation, the coordination is highly beneficial.  It will ensure 
consistent pretrial rulings and allow parties—especially the defendants—to 
save resources “by litigating their case in a single court that’s most 
convenient for the parties.”325  Although the JPML is the only entity that has 
the ability to formally aggregate a series of direct-injury government-entity 
claims,326 lawyers have the ability to informally aggregate their claims 
through private aggregation. 
E.  Informal Aggregation Incentivizes Settlement 
In addition to being administratively aggregated by the judicial branch, the 
opioid litigation has been informally aggregated by private parties and state 
attorneys general.  Informal (or private) aggregation occurs when parties 
involved in widespread litigation, rather than judges, “act as though the 
separate suits were formally aggregated, coordinating their efforts to such an 
extent as to amount to a treatment of the litigation as a single, integrated 
whole.”327  Similar to administrative aggregations, these informal 
aggregations begin as separate trials.328  However, unlike formal 
administrative aggregations, informal aggregations continue as separate 
trials.329  Rather than relying on judicial oversight, plaintiffs exploit “the 
existence of multiple and related claims” and place management “in the 
hands of a few attorneys or even a single firm” to aggregate lawsuits 
themselves.330  Some scholars “argue that informal aggregation can be as 
efficient as formal aggregation” and just as effective for the pooling of 
resources.331 
Learning from the 1990s tobacco litigation, plaintiffs involved in the 
opioid litigation have informally aggregated their claims to pool resources 
and coordinate strategy.  Famous litigators from the tobacco litigation are 
collaborating with private attorneys and state AGs to create a powerful force 
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against opioid companies.332  Two lawyers in particular, Mike Moore and 
Paul Hanly, are leading the effort.  Mike Moore has spearheaded a 
nationwide coalition against opioid companies.  His name may only be listed 
on a series of lawsuits filed in Mississippi, but his involvement spreads 
beyond state boundaries.333  He has a built an alliance with his “longtime 
friends . . . includ[ing] former Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods, the 
first Republican state attorney general to join the anti-tobacco crusade, and 
Chip Robertson, a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri who 
helped his state sue tobacco companies.”334  In July 2017 he met with “more 
than a dozen private attorneys” and coordinated legal strategies against 
opioid companies just as he did for the litigation against tobacco 
companies.335  Paul Hanly plays a similar role.  Based in New York, he has 
commenced lawsuits “for close to 30 of the state’s 62 counties.”336  Hanly 
represented the thousands of private plaintiffs that settled with Purdue 
Pharma in 2007 and is using the knowledge gained from those previous 
lawsuits to garner a stronger force against opioid companies.337  Some 
scholars view Hanly and Moore’s efforts as evidence of dangerous power 
concentrations and argue that private aggregation in the context of mass tort 
liability has grown so strong “that a small number of attorneys exercise a 
virtual monopoly over public tort litigation.”338 
Despite their monopolistic qualities, informal aggregations are particularly 
useful in the context of mass tort liability because they increase the chances 
of securing the government’s true objective:  a large settlement.  State AGs 
already have “greater litigation resources and moral authority than is 
typically present in mass tort actions initiated by private attorneys.”339  When 
these state AGs combine with other AGs and private attorneys, “their 
resources and moral authority are even more powerful.”340  Informal 
aggregations as large in scope as the tobacco and opioid litigation create a 
“combined litigation muscle, moral authority, and [high] potential for 
winning overwhelming judgments.”341  Most importantly, the combined 
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muscle allows plaintiffs to procure “large settlements even when their 
underlying legal claims are questionable.”342 
The ability to speed up settlement talk is valuable for plaintiffs involved 
in public tort litigation because their best chance is the procurement of large 
settlements.  The plaintiff’s side of the opioid litigation has learned valuable 
lessons from the tobacco litigation, when “State Attorneys General from 
across the country joined forces to launch a full scale, multi-state, multi-issue 
attack . . . recogniz[ing] that the most efficient approach to the litigation was 
a multi-state coordinated negotiation process.”343  By focusing on 
negotiation rather than adjudication, these AGs made it evident that 
settlement was their true objective in the tobacco litigation.  Similarly, when 
the FDA sued Purdue Pharma for its off-label marketing of OxyContin,344 it 
relied upon “extensive collaboration among the state Attorneys General and 
the federal investigators to achieve a swift and extensive settlement against a 
company and its wrongdoers.”345  Government entities are not concerned 
with arguing questionable legal theories because they “do not expect their 
cases to actually go to trial.”346  Instead, plaintiffs hope to “survive a motion 
to dismiss” and settle without evaluating the “the doctrinal soundness of their 
position.”347  Informal aggregation incentivizes defendants to settle their 
claims swiftly and avoids evaluation of the plaintiff’s dubious claims.  In 
addition to bypassing certification requirements due to their inherently 
representative nature, the ability to informally aggregate separate actions 
makes direct-injury claims a mighty tool for opioid victims and the state and 
local governments that represent them. 
CONCLUSION 
All branches and levels of government have pursued both proactive and 
reactive measures to combat the opioid epidemic and recover societal costs 
incurred as a result of the epidemic.  Direct-injury government-entity claims 
are perhaps the most interesting reactive measure because they allege injury 
to the interests of the government entity itself rather than its constituents.  
These direct-injury claims offer a more powerful alternative to parens 
patriae actions and can be asserted by any government entity as the sole basis 
for both recovery and standing.  Echoing the tobacco litigation efforts of the 
1990s, these government claims have been informally aggregated by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to create a powerful force against opioid companies. 
Most importantly, direct-injury government claims elude the challenges 
faced by both individual and aggregate actions in the opioid litigation.  With 
a city, county, or state as the plaintiff, the government is able to effectively 
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foreclose conduct-based defenses reliant upon the plaintiff’s blameworthy 
conduct.  Furthermore, these direct-injury government-entity claims 
inherently function as representative actions that aggregate the interests of 
taxpayers into a single action led by their AG.  As an inherent rather than 
formal representative action, these lawsuits reap the benefits of aggregation 
but bypass the Rule 23(a) certification requirements that hindered class 
actions against opioid companies.  Furthermore, unlike class actions, they do 
not have the potential to bind nonparties to judgments.  Considering all the 
benefits of direct-injury claims, it is no surprise that government entities 
across the country have chosen civil litigation as their weapon of choice 
against pharmaceutical giants. 
 
